

# Introduction: Understanding “Living with China”

*Shiping Tang*<sup>1</sup>

In the early 1990s, when China's economic growth became impossible to ignore, many regional observers became anxious about how China was going to exercise its growing power. Along with the anxiety about China's power and intentions, various proposals for handling the “China Problem”—from containment, to engagement, to conengagement, to hedging—also began to dominate policy conversations in the region.<sup>2</sup>

So far, however, much of the debate on the China Problem has been not only Western-centric but also heavily theory driven (partly because it was Western-centric). There has been an outstanding dearth of regional voices in the debate and, at the same time, an outstanding lack of solid empirical work on how regional states have coped with the rise of China.<sup>3</sup> By and large, pundits outside the region have advanced their preferred policy recommendations based on their theoretical or intuitive readings into the history of the rise and fall of great powers, without paying much attention to the real world.

In other words, few have looked into the actual process through which regional states have managed to live with a rising China and how their dynamic interaction has coincided with one and a half decades of relative peace and robust growth in the region despite shocks from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the fallout from the September 11 terrorist attacks, SARS, and the Bird flu.

With more than a decade since the rise of the debate on China now may be a good time to assess what has really happened between China and regional states. Because regional states are more sensitive to China's behavior, they should also be the most qualified to make that assessment.

This volume is the product of such an attempt. Its stories of how regional states have actually lived with China in the past decade or so are told by scholars from individual regional states. Importantly, many of these authors have intimate knowledge gained from active involvement in shaping their

## 2 SHIPING TANG

own countries' interactions with China. By telling their side of the story, they project a distinctive regional voice in the ongoing debate.

Although we intentionally exclude case studies on the United States and other Western hemisphere states, we do seek to contribute to the discussion about China's rise outside the region—in an “inside-out” way. As stated above, most of the existing works on the rise of China and its relations with neighbors have been very much Western-centric, if not U.S.-centric. While many are based on extensive interviews with observers and government officials in the region, they certainly have not captured the whole picture. The voices of scholars, often with first-hand knowledge about the policy-formulating process of their governments and the grassroots shift of attitude toward China among the populace, provide a special perspective on how the U.S.-China relationship affects the interaction of regional states with both China and the United States. While the U.S.-China relationship—not surprisingly—features prominently as many regional states calculate their China policy, their calculations also seem to be quite different from those of either Washington or Beijing, as Amitav Acharya notes in his concluding chapter.

In the rest of this introduction, I first underscore the questions and the approaches taken in this volume. I then extract some common themes that have emerged from the individual chapters, with the conviction that these common themes can serve as possible guidance for building cooperation among states and a foundation for more theory building. Next, I summarize the major findings of the individual chapters. A brief concluding section follows.

### Questions and Approaches

This volume is broadly interested in three sets of questions. How have regional states and China interacted? How has this dynamic interaction between China and regional states shaped China, regional states, and the region itself? What lessons can we learn from these interactions? Such an enterprise emphatically requires an empirical approach toward the problem of “living with China.”

To distinguish our volume from the existing literature, that is, Western international relations (IR) theory-driven approach or a general historical survey, our project takes a unique case-studies approach. Each contributor from a regional state is to select two or three major crises or turning points in his or her country's interaction with China. Crises can be cases in which China and a particular regional state work together to resolve, exacerbate, or even take advantage of the crisis (for good and bad reasons), and turning points can be for better or worse. We justify this approach not only to differentiate this volume from the existing literature on living with China but also because crises and turning points are more telling cases for understanding how China and regional states have managed to live with each other.

To accommodate the diversity and complexity of challenges faced by China and regional states in dealing with each other, we adopt a broad definition of crisis and turning point in this volume. A crisis is simply an emerging major conflict of interest that can cause significant deterioration in a bilateral relationship, from serious dispute to a possible use of force (i.e., actual conflict). A turning point is an event that, in hindsight, has significantly shaped the course of events followed.

This volume also seeks to contribute to theorizing about international politics. Contrary to the increasingly deductive approach in the United States and the grand theorizing approach in Europe that have traditionally paid less attention to empirical facts, we believe that empirical facts provide the ultimate foundation for theorizing about international politics. We also reject light and simplistic application of realist, neoliberal, or constructivist arguments to empirical facts. Instead, we let each author come up with his or her own rigorous explanation for the empirical facts. In this way, we not only avoid imposing crude and superficially theoretical explanations but also provide proto-theories for further development.

Because each author is allowed to formulate explanations in his or her own way, we also adopt an eclectic approach for theorizing IR. As such, we obtain a wide spectrum of explanations in terms of the approaches being deployed. Precisely because of this diversity, some of the common themes that have emerged from these individual chapters not only are compelling but also present broader themes that can be pursued more theoretically.

### **Cooperation Building in International Politics: Some Common Themes**

Cooperation, defined as "a reaction to conflict or potential conflict" and "successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential,"<sup>4</sup> has been a constant theme in international politics. Offensive realism asserts that cooperation among nations will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, both defensive realism and neoliberalism argue that cooperation among nations is possible. Unfortunately, much of the defensive realist and neoliberal writing on cooperation has been too structural, and too centered on the United States or Europe, to the extent that a recent contribution to this topic makes the claim that "[Gorbachev's effort] is perhaps the *only* case in which such actions [i.e., reassurance gestures] helped to bring about a fundamental change in a once-adversarial relationship."<sup>6</sup>

The empirical cases presented in this volume challenge the notion that cooperation in international politics has been extremely rare. From the chapters on individual countries' interactions with China in the past three

#### 4 SHIPINGTANG

decades, it becomes clear that China and regional states have indeed managed to build more cooperative relationships, and several interesting common themes emerge.

##### *Cooperation Building: Issue Linkage Vs. Issue De-linking*

In the general IR literature, linkage of issues has usually been touted as an effective tool for building cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

An important common theme revealed by the individual chapters has been a major reason why China and regional states have been able to move into a more cooperative relationship: they have managed their relationships by delinking different issues. In other words, rather than striving for a grand bargain to resolve many disputes in one bold stroke, China and the regional states have generally been pragmatic enough to move forward with things that can be resolved for now, while leaving aside issues that cannot be resolved. This dynamic generated more goodwill (trust) and spillover effect. This tactic is especially important in improving China's relationships with India, the Philippines, and Russia. In light of the empirical evidence from this volume, the notion that linkage of issues is an effective tool for building cooperation may be misleading.

The idea of linkage being effective in building cooperation is also flawed on theoretical grounds. Fundamentally, it is based on the flawed understanding that cooperation is the result of more trust. In reality, cooperation is not only a product of more trust but, *perhaps more importantly*, a producer of trust; cooperation leads to more trust.<sup>8</sup> If this is the case, delinking is more conducive to cooperation while issue linkage is counterproductive. Delinking means building cooperation in some areas so that more trust can be accumulated, and this increased trust will then spill over and facilitate more cooperation. Delinking is good because it contains issues, limits the areas of dispute, and resolves things gradually.

In contrast, issue linkage means many instances of quid pro quo, thus limiting the chances of obtaining cooperation in some issue areas via piecemeal cooperation building. Issue linkage is essentially a coercive measure to extract concessions from the other side, and "cooperation" obtained from such a process can be only tactical concessions, not genuine cooperation based on goodwill to forge a more cooperative relationship. As a result, even if one side succeeds in coercing the other side into concession through issue linkage, the chance for achieving a more cooperative relationship is reduced because such an outcome generates resentment rather than trust from the other side. More likely than not, the other side will want some payback next time, rather than a more cooperative relationship. Certainly, while issue linkage was one of Henry Kissinger's favorite tools for getting the Soviet Union to agree to some concessions during the Cold War years, he had no intention to build cooperation with the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup>

*Domestic Politics and Cooperation*

In sharp contrast to the growing body of neoclassical realism literature on the impact of domestic politics upon war and conflict,<sup>10</sup> the literature on the impact of domestic politics upon peace and cooperation has been dismal. This reflects not only a general bias for war studies within IR, but also a general structuralism bias within the existing theoretical literature on peace and cooperation.<sup>11</sup>

Two observations that emerge from the empirical cases testify to the crucial role of domestic politics in driving states' cooperation with each other.

A salient issue in some of the regional states' interaction with China has been the presence of a sizable population of ethnic Chinese, most notably in Indonesia and Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, in the Philippines and Thailand too. While the case studies on Indonesia and Malaysia/Thailand do not exclusively focus on the problem of ethnic Chinese within their domestic politics, they highlight that the perception of each country's public and elite concerning the problem of ethnic Chinese inevitably influences their perception of China.

This observation is not surprising. The literature on ethnic conflict makes it clear that the presence of one country's major ethnic group in another country as a minority group (e.g., ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, or ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Kazakhstan) may pose a very sensitive challenge for the two states in managing their relationship. One can easily imagine that real or perceived ill-treatment of the minority group by its host state can provoke a public outcry in the state in which the group holds a majority. For instance, China reacted strongly to the 1994 riot against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and the Chinese leadership faced strong public pressure to act more forcefully during the rampage against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in 1998. Such dynamics can easily exacerbate the tension between the two states. Worse yet, the deteriorating relationship between the two states will then come back to exacerbate the tension between the two ethnic groups.<sup>12</sup> For this problem, the best outcome is for countries with a sizable ethnic Chinese population to treat the ethnic Chinese as full citizens rather than second-class citizens or aliens.

Rizal Sukma's chapter on the Indonesia-China relationship indicates that a potential way forward is through democratization. Sukma documents that Indonesia's effort to reconcile with its ethnic Chinese population followed Indonesia's democratization, which is by no means over. Because a democratically elected government no longer needs the ethnic Chinese population and China as an enemy to shore up its legitimacy, as an authoritarian regime under Suharto did, a democratic Indonesia *is* in a better position to offer affirmative action to its ethnic Chinese population. This theme certainly goes against the widely held notion that democratization increases the probability of war. Indonesia thus presents an interesting case for understanding how a country's

democratization promotes affirmative action for its minorities and, arguably, that only a democracy can provide this equal citizenship for all its citizens.

Of course, the better the relationship between Indonesia's majority population and its ethnic Chinese population, the easier it would be for China and Indonesia to manage their relationships. As such, democratization may actually facilitate rather than jeopardize cooperation building among states.

### *Asymmetric Power, the Security Dilemma, and Cooperation*

Other than India, Japan, and Russia, most of China's neighboring states are middle-sized to smaller states.

The security dilemma is a key concept for understanding both conflict and cooperation in international politics.<sup>13</sup> Considering that distribution of power is central for realism, it is perhaps surprising that asymmetric power has never been seriously considered in conjunction with the security dilemma. Indeed, much of the security dilemma literature implicitly assumes a symmetric distribution of power between the two actors.<sup>14</sup> Because asymmetric distribution of power between two states is usually the norm rather than the exception, however, asymmetric distribution of power should be treated as an important physical regulator of the security dilemma.<sup>15</sup> Understanding how asymmetric distribution of power regulates the security dilemma will provide us with some much-needed insight into how to manage the relationship between a (regional) great power and its smaller neighbors.

AQ1

The security dilemma theory suggests that in a relationship of asymmetric power, the weaker party will be more sensitive and thus more likely to overreact. As a result, to alleviate or at least contain the security dilemma, the stronger power needs to be more reassuring and self-restraining.<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately, more power not only tends to lessen the incentives for the stronger state to be moderate because the cost of conflict will be relatively lower for it, but also tends to make it less willing to be constrained because it can overcome the constraint. Meanwhile, because the weaker state is more sensitive, and thus more likely to overreact, it may take some defensive measures that will be deemed hostile by the stronger power. One such measure is perhaps particularly alarming for the intraregional stronger power: the weaker state forms a tight alliance with an extraregional great power with whom the intraregional stronger power does not enjoy a friendly relationship, thus arousing the intraregional stronger power's fear of being contained by the weaker state and the external great power. The delicate triangular relationship between the United States, the Southeast Asian nations, and China is one good example of this situation.<sup>17</sup>

The stories told by some of the chapters testify that there may be some genuine lessons to be learned about how to manage the relationship between a great power and its smaller neighbors.

It seems that a key reason why China and ASEAN states have been getting along with each other well is that ASEAN states have been able to hedge against the possibility of an aggressive China without overreacting and thus alarming China, perhaps because there is an ASEAN as a regional institution<sup>18</sup> and there is a robust U.S. military presence in the region. Thus, while there have been prominent voices outside the region that call for a hard containment approach toward China, ASEAN states have generally rejected such an approach. Instead, ASEAN states have favored an engagement approach toward China (with a dose of hedging, of course),<sup>19</sup> with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) being a major platform both for socializing China and letting China understand ASEAN and multilateralism in general.<sup>20</sup>

As China gradually learned about ASEAN, ARF, and the intentions of ASEAN states, ASEAN states were able to alleviate China's fear and build up China's confidence that ASEAN states are not hostile to China. In this sense, ASEAN states really have had a powerful "pull" effect in shaping a more benign and proactive regional strategy from China, as Li Mingjiang's chapter in this volume argues.

Meanwhile, as China comes to accept the ASEAN way, ASEAN states have been able to increase their confidence in China's benign intentions. The net result is that China and most ASEAN states have improved their relationship greatly since the mid-1990s. The same can be said about China and its Central Asian neighbors within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

### *Reconciliation: Identity and Interest*

The prominence of constructivism in the general IR literature has obscured a fundamental problem within the literature—the lack of rigorously pursued empirical cases for supporting Wendt's claim that "anarchy is what states make of it."<sup>21</sup>

We believe that reconciliation, defined as the process through which former opponents reshape their hostile relationship into a stable peace,<sup>22</sup> should serve as the ultimate testing ground for constructivism's claim. If states that were bitter enemies can reach robust reconciliations, then anarchy can indeed be fundamentally (re)made.

The case studies presented in the volume present four cases of reconciliation between China and some of its neighbors: the more successful one between China and Russia, and three with varying degrees of success between China on the one side and India, Japan, and Vietnam on the other side. In addition, China's relationship with Indonesia can be taken as a case of relatively successful reconciliation, considering the acrimonious relationship between the two for a very long time, even though the two countries had not fought a war against each other.

These case studies indicate that reconciliation is possible: former bitter foes can be made into amicable neighbors; partners, if not friends or allies. But

## 8 SHIPING TANG

the causes for these instances of remaking anarchy might have been far more complex than constructivism imagines.

The case studies in this volume certainly support the notion that identity is critical for remaking anarchy. As Haruko Satoh points out in her reflective/constructivist interpretation of the Sino-Japanese relationship, the two countries' different interpretations of the history of the wars between them has certainly played an important role in their division. As such, a convergence of the interpretation of history is a must if a robust reconciliation is to materialize between China and Japan.

However, the case studies also support the notion that the beginning of reconciliation can be very "realist" or instrumental: states can reconcile only if they believe that reconciliation is in their interest. The fairly successful reconciliation between Russia and China, and to a lesser extent between China and Vietnam and between China and Indonesia, all began initially because both sides felt the need to repair their relationship. Hence, the results support Norrin Ripsman's argument that making peace requires realism, although maintaining peace may require neoliberalism.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, because identity itself is a social construct, it is thus constructed by cooperation, not the cause of cooperation. In this sense, the differences between realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism have been exaggerated. For one thing, it is simply difficult to see how cooperative institutions can emerge without some reassurance-driven cooperation *beforehand*, and how a common and cooperative identity can emerge without some cooperation and cooperative institutions *beforehand*. As such, a dialogue among these different "-isms" is not only possible but also potentially very profitable.

### The Structure of the Volume

The rest of the volume following this introductory chapter is divided into three major parts: chapters on China itself, chapters on regional states' interaction with China, and a concluding chapter. The first part serves to provide some background for the second part, which constitutes the bulk of the empirical studies of regional states' interaction with China. The concluding chapter provides a more holistic interpretation of the interactions between regional states and China.

#### *Chapters on China*

The volume contains three chapters on China's regional strategy written by Chinese scholars.

In the first chapter, Li Mingjiang seeks to explain China's proactive engagement with its neighbors, now that many have argued that China has formulated



a more-or-less coherent regional strategy.<sup>24</sup> The central question to be addressed in this chapter is how China has been able to formulate a generally coherent regional strategy. What were the major (good) ideas behind China's regional strategy? Where did those ideas come from? And what made those ideas into the official policy? The author highlights three critical factors that have driven China's more coherent regional strategy: the strategic imperatives of economic development, China's constant apprehension of a possible U.S.-led encirclement of China, and the "pull" effect from most of China's neighboring states (especially ASEAN states, but also Russia and Central Asian states). The author further emphasizes that these factors work not independently but interactively to shape China's regional strategy.

In the second chapter, Qi Dapeng addresses the role of the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) in China's regional strategy. Qi explores two key questions. First, what kind of role does the PLA play in China's regional strategy? Second, what are the challenges to the PLA's fulfilling its assigned roles in China's regional strategy? Qi argues that national development has gradually replaced national survival as the focus of China's national security strategy, reflecting China's increasing confidence in its survival and future (which is, of course, underpinned by a general improvement in China's security environment). Accordingly, the PLA has been assigned the new mission of ensuring China's development interests. Compared to the single-minded emphasis on the means of military confrontation and conflict in safeguarding China's national survival in the past, the PLA's new mission now emphasizes more strengthening of military confidence building and cooperation. The author acknowledges that there is some inherent tension between the need to reassure China's neighbors and the United States on the one hand and the need to deter Taiwan from going independent and to conquer Taiwan if necessary on the other hand. He concludes by exploring possible measures to build more trust between the PLA and other armed forces in the region.

In the third chapter, Liang Ruobing addresses the politics of China's growing economic presence in the region. Over the years, many pundits have argued that many of China's initiatives in regional economic integration (e.g., free trade agreements with ASEAN countries, and the often discussed FTA with South Korea and Japan) have been underpinned by a political rather than an economic motive. Admitting that all high economics is politics, Liang Ruobing seeks to explore how much politics has really influenced China's economic interactions with regional states. The preliminary results, not surprising to economists, indicate that while political motives might have propelled some of China's economic initiatives to forge a close relationship with its neighbors, politics has very little impact on China's economic presence in the region. Its economic presence is fundamentally supported by economic forces such as division of labor, comparative advantage, and the global production network.

*Chapters on Regional States' Interaction with China*

The second part of this volume contains nine chapters, each on a particular regional state's interaction with China through crises and turning points. (For the list of the crises and turning points examined within the chapters, see Table I.1.)

The individual contributors have been advised to keep the following five sets of questions in mind and touch upon them when they examine the individual cases. These questions also provide the common thread that links the individual chapters together.

First, do regional states see a coherent and consistent regional strategy from China? If so, what are the major characteristics of such a regional strategy? More importantly, how do regional states judge the nature, the intention, and the strategic rationale behind such a regional strategy?

Second, how have regional states reacted to some of the major policy initiatives or behaviors of China? Specifically, what has been the major strategic thinking (or rethinking) behind regional states' policies toward China? Do regional states mostly make their policies toward China based on their more narrowly defined national interest, or do they derive some of their policies toward China from a desire to socialize China? How have external events (e.g., the 1997 Asian financial crisis, September 11) been driving some of the policies toward China?

Third, how has China reacted to some of the major individual or collective policy changes or initiatives from regional states? What are the complaints and recommendations from regional states, if there are any?

Fourth, how do the regional states' policy elites assess their own country's China policy? Are they satisfied or dissatisfied with what they have so far

**Table I.1** Crises and Turning Points between China and its Neighbors Examined in the Volume, 1989–2005

| <i>Countries</i>          | <i>Turning Points and Crises</i>   |
|---------------------------|--|
| Indonesia and China       | 1997 Asian financial crisis, 1998 riot against ethnic Chinese, and 2004 Tsunami                  |
| India and China           | 1998 India nuclear test, 1999 Kargil crisis  |
| Japan and China           | The tenure of Koizumi, 2001–2006   |
| Pakistan and China        | 1999 Kargil crisis, September 11, 2001   |
| The Philippines and China | 1994–1995 Mischief Reef dispute  |
| Russia and China          | 2001 border demarcation, September 11, 2001<br>Oil pipelines from Russia to China                |
| South Korea               | Koguryo dispute, 20012005  |
| Vietnam                   | 2000 border demarcation<br>Vietnam's balancing act between the United States and China, 19982005 |

achieved (together with China)? What will be the major lessons they draw for their own country and for China in managing their future interactions?

Finally, what implications for the region does this dynamic interaction hold? Do China and regional states hold a generally optimistic or generally pessimistic view about the future of the region? What implications does this dynamic interaction also hold for other great powers, both outside and inside the region (e.g., the United States, Japan, and India)?

With these questions in the background, Swaran Singh opens this part with a chapter on India-China relations. Singh argues that the plurality of Indian society makes Indian perspectives vulnerable to different internal and external pushes and pulls, thus making India's living with China complicated. He notes, however, that the two countries have managed to patch up many things, although deep distrust still lingers. Singh examines two major turning points in the bilateral relationship, India's nuclear tests of 1998 and the fourth India-Pakistan war in the Kargil sector in 1999, to highlight the process and outcome of their confidence building. He concludes that these confidence-building efforts have greatly increased the probability that the two countries will be able to overcome similar challenges in the future.

Rizal Sukma examines the dynamics of interactions between Indonesia and China by focusing on three cases: China's responses to the 1997 economic crisis, the May 1998 riots in Indonesia, and the 2004 Tsunami disaster. Sukma argues that recent improvements in bilateral relations have been primarily the function of dramatic changes in Indonesia's domestic politics, although China's changing policy toward Southeast Asia in general and toward the ethnic Chinese issue in particular has also contributed to the coming of an atmosphere of trust and comfort in Jakarta's reengagement with China. He concludes by arguing that despite these improvements, the future course of Indonesia-China relations will continue to be subject to the persistence of Indonesia's domestic ambiguity toward China, emanating from the question of the Indonesian ethnic Chinese minority and Indonesia's perceptions of China's intentions and policy in Southeast Asia.

Haruko Satoh takes a more reflective/interpretive approach (i.e., more akin to constructivism) toward the more troubled relationship between Japan and China. She argues that Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine might have been the Bitburg for restarting a genuine reconciliation between Japan and China. Precisely because Koizumi had made the visit to the shrine such a prominent issue during his tenure, a more open debate on the meaning of history within Japan became possible and, perhaps, inevitable. In light of the fact there has already been some "new thinking" toward Japan from China, Satoh argues that a genuine reconciliation between Japan and China becomes likely, perhaps more so than ever before.

## 12 SHIPINGTANG

Joseph Chinyong Liow and Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman contributed the only comparative study in this volume. Among Southeast Asian states, Malaysia and Thailand represent two countries for which “living with China” in the post – Cold War era has not posed a major problem. Thus, it is interesting to explore whether there have been common factors that have made the two countries’ relationships with China relatively free of major ruptures. The two authors find that although the exact circumstances were different, there has been a major and common turn in Thai and Malaysian perspectives on China since the end of the Cold War. Whereas both countries viewed China as a major threat for much of the Cold War, they no longer do so in the post – Cold War period. The two authors attribute the shift to the interactions between China’s diplomacy and Malaysia’s and Thailand’s general acceptance of China’s rise and its essentially peaceful nature. As such, both countries see the rise of China as bringing more benefits than perils to the region.

Fazal-ur-Rahman focuses on Pakistan-China interactions during two major crisis situations, the conflict in Kargil in 1999 and the military standoff in 2001-2002. Through a detailed description of how Pakistan and China handled the two crises, Fazal-ur-Rahman offers a nuanced picture about the changes and continuities in Pakistan-China relations in the past decade. He underscores that China has been following a consistent policy in South Asia since the early 1980s that aims at securing good-neighborly relations, peace, and political and strategic stability in the region, and that China’s policy toward Pakistan has been shaped by this overall policy toward South Asia.

Aileen San Pablo – Baviera traces the transformation of Philippines-China relations by examining two cases: the disputes over territory and maritime jurisdiction in the Spratly Islands and the problem of intrusions and illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen in Philippine waters. She details *how* the two states have handled these disputes and then explains *why* they have not prevented the two states from nurturing a normal and even cooperative relationship. She contends that the global and regional strategic environment, bilateral interactions, and domestic politics in the two countries have all shaped the way Beijing and Manila interact with each other.

Alexander Lukin goes behind the sound Russia-China relations and explores how the two countries have been able to manage problems between them. Lukin argues that there is a fairly high level of trust between the two countries and that the high level of trust manifests itself not in the absence of any differences but in the ability of the two countries to solve these differences in the spirit of cooperation and on the basis of compromise and mutual benefit. Lukin examines three thorny problems in the Russia-China relationship in recent years: the problem of Chinese immigration into Russia’s Far East, border demarcation between the two countries, and the issue of Russian oil export to China. He concludes that strategic considerations, individual leaders’

timely and resolute interventions, domestic politics, and willingness to cooperate and compromise on both sides, particularly on the part of China, all have contributed to the process of problem solving.

Jae Ho Chang examines the impact of the recent controversy over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo upon South Korea's perception of China. Chang emphasizes that the dispute has the potential to significantly damage the generally warm relationship between South Korea and China. While the two governments were able to dampen the dispute, it continues to lurk below the surface. Chang thus suggests that South Korea's mode of response to the rising China, although certainly geared toward active engagement, is not firmly fixed and continues to evolve. He further highlights the possibility that South Korea may have entered into a phase of "reawakening" in terms of perceiving and constructing its relations with China in the wake of the Koguryo saga.

Alex Vuving pursues a more analytical approach toward the relationship between China and Vietnam. He seeks to answer the question how Vietnam and China have been able to overcome so much historical hostility and reach the current level of cooperation between them. Vuving examines two major turning points, a near resolution of the long border dispute between the two countries and Vietnam's delicately balanced relationship between China and the United States (i.e., Vietnam has been able to get close to the United States without raising much alarm from China). Vuving argues that this is primarily due to a "grand strategic fit" between Vietnam, China, and the United States that has gradually emerged after the Cold War, and he supports his interpretations with empirical facts.

### *The Concluding Chapter: A Broader Perspective*

The concluding chapter by Amitav Acharya asks the broader question: what does this dynamic interaction between China and the regional states mean for the region, China, and the United States? As a constructivist, Amitav explores whether there are some emerging norms or codes of conduct for this interaction and what are the potential implications of these emerging norms or codes of conduct for peace, stability, and security institutions within the region. All these questions are of critical importance to China and the regional states, if we assume that much of the region's future hinges on how these states and China manage their future interactions.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The China Problem poses, as the cliché goes, both a challenge and an opportunity for the region's prosperity and stability. So far, it seems that the region has responded to the challenge of China's rise fairly well. Almost all the analysts

## 14 SHIPING TANG

from regional states see that their countries have managed to live with China better, not worse, except perhaps Japan from 2000 to 2007, echoing the major conclusion in several existing works on China's foreign policy.<sup>25</sup>

The problem also presents a challenge and an opportunity for the region's intellectual future. For one thing, China's rise provides an important impetus for debating the larger question of the future of the region. Unlike Western powers, China has always been part of the region. Unlike Imperial Japan and even the post-WWII Japan that had and has debated whether Japan should remain part of Asia and/or become part of the West, China has never seriously doubted the meaning of its geographical location. China seems to have always been certain about its regional identity, leaving only its exact role in the region to be debated or constructed. Moreover, having lived through its romantic revolutionary era that sought to remake the region by exporting revolution, China now firmly recognizes that the region can be (re)made only by the coevolution of all the states inside the region, including China.

The intellectual community of the region has yet to be able to project a distinctive regional voice in this debate on relations with China. We hope that this volume will stimulate more in-depth and rigorous research into the question of coping with the challenges posed by a rising China.

Finally, the China Problem also presents IR theorists with a fertile ground for theoretical innovations. As summarized in the beginning of this introduction, some common themes are visible among the different countries' experiences of living with a rising China. These common themes can and should be explored in a more theoretical setting.<sup>26</sup> We thus also hope that the publication of this volume will stimulate more theoretical innovation in IR theory, especially on the theory of cooperation building.

### Notes

1. Shiping Tang is senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He has finished a book manuscript titled *Defensive Realism: Toward A Coherent Statement*. He is now working on another book titled *Social Evolution of International Politics*. He thanks Amitav Acharya and Mingjiang Li for their critical comments on an earlier draft.
2. By "the region" or "regional states," we mean the region in which China's behavior is most concentrated. Thus the region includes East Asia (Northeast and Southeast Asia), Russia and Central Asia, South Asia, and Oceania (i.e., Australia and New Zealand).
3. Three notable exceptions are Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, London: Routledge, 1999; David Shambaugh (ed.), *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press,

2008. Even these three books, however, are mostly (co)authored by scholars outside the region.
4. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (pp. 53-54), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
  5. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2001, Chapter 1.
  6. Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," *International Security*, Vol. 31 No. 2 pp. 151-185 (Fall 2006). Emphasis added. For a challenge to this theme, see Shiping Tang, "Correspondence: Uncertainty and Cooperation in International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 193-197 (Summer 2007).
  7. See, for example, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*, Vol. 38 No. 1 pp. 226-254 (October 1985).
  8. For a detailed exposition of this thesis, see Shiping Tang, *Defensive Realism: A Systematic Statement* (unpublished book manuscript), Chapter 5. See also Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, Esp. Chapter 2.
  9. Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978.
  10. For a more recent review of this literature, see Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman (eds.), *Progress in International Relations Theory* (pp. 311-347), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003.
  11. For instance, Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help," *International Security*, Vol. 19 No. 3 pp. 50-90 (Winter 1994-1995); Montgomery, "Breaking out of the Security Dilemma".
  12. For detailed discussions on China's reaction toward riots against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, see Daojiong Zha, "China and the May 1998 Riots of Indonesia: Exploring the Issues," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 13 No. 4 pp. 557-575 (2002) and the chapter by Sukma in this volume.
  13. The seminal original contribution on the security dilemma is Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, Chapter 3; *Id.*, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30 No. 2 pp. 167-214 (January 1978). Much of the existing discussion on the security dilemma, however, suffers from confusion. For a more rigorous reformulation, see Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies* (2009, forthcoming).
  14. Collins's discussion on the interaction between China and the Southeast Asian states after the Cold War is a rare good treatment of this subject. See Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia*, London: Macmillan, 2000, Chapter 5.
  15. For a general treatment on the impact of asymmetric distribution of power on state relations, see Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  16. This implication fits with the axiom that "more power brings more responsibility." Unfortunately, like Metternich, many statesmen understand "more responsibility" to mean more intervention rather than more reassurance

## 16 SHIPING TANG

- and moderation. Metternich cited in Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," p. 169.
17. For a good discussion, see Collins, *The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia*.
  18. This is a possible function of international institutions that neoliberalism has yet to pay much attention to.
  19. Jusuf Wanandi, "ASEAN's China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement," *Survival*, Vol. 38 No. 3 pp. 117-128 (Autumn 1996). Indeed, hedging is an integral part of the engagement approach.
  20. For the socializing effect of ASEAN and ARF, see Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organization Process and Domestic Models of Thought," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38 No. 5 pp. 425-440 (May 1998); Alstair Iain Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory," in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds), *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific* (pp. 107-159), New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
  21. Alex Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46 No. 2 pp. 391-425 (Spring 1992).
  22. Reconciliation or conflict resolution is different from conflict termination or settlement. Conflict termination or settlement does not necessarily lead to reconciliation and sometimes may actually lay the seeds for another round of conflict (e.g., the Versailles Treaty).
  23. Norrin M. Ripsman, "Two Stages of Transition from a Region of War to a Region of Peace: Realist Transition and Liberal Endurance," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49 No. 4 pp. 669-693 (December 2005).
  24. Works that reach this conclusion, among others, include: David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," *International Security*, Vol. 29 No. 3 pp. 64-99 (Winter 2004/2005); Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *China Quarterly*, No. 168 pp. 835-864 (December 2001); Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82 No. 6 pp. 22-35 (November/December 2003); Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, "China's Regional Strategy," in David Shambaugh (ed.), *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics* (pp. 54-74), Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
  25. See, for example, Shambaugh, *Power Shift*; Kang, *China Rising*; David Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Money, Might, and Mind*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. For an earlier treatment in a broader context that remains relevant, see Collins, *Security Dilemma in Southeast Asia*, Chapter 5. For a less sanguine assessment, see Robert Sutter, *China Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils*, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
  26. For why common themes (i.e., analogous things) are fertile ground for theorizing laws, see Marion Blute, "History Versus Science: The Evolutionary Solution," *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 22 No. 3 pp. 345-364 (Summer 1997).



## QUERIES TO BE ANSWERED BY AUTHOR (SEE MARGINAL MARKS)

IMPORTANT NOTE: Please mark your corrections and answer to these queries directly onto the proof at the relevant place. Do NOT mark your corrections on this query sheet.

## Introduction

| Query No. | Page No. | Query   |
|-----------|----------|---|
| AQ1       | 6        | Please update the forth coming reference in footnote 13 |