

Review Article

RECONCILIATION AND THE REMAKING OF ANARCHY

By SHIPING TANG*

The past is never dead. In fact, it is not even past. —*William Faulkner*

Anarchy is what states make of it. —*Alexander Wendt*

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiki Togo, eds. 2008. *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism*. Westport: Praeger, 276 pp.

Yinan He. 2009. *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and Germany-Polish Relations after WWII*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 384 pp.

Charles A. Kupchan. 2010. *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 442 pp.

Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu, eds. 2006. *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 400 pp.

Jennifer Lind. 2008. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 256 pp.

Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy, and Jeffrey D. Fisher, eds. 2008. *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University press, 497 pp.

FOR too long, mainstream international relations (IR) literature has essentially ignored reconciliation as a special—and perhaps the most difficult—form of cooperation building in international politics. Of course, social psychologists,¹ sociologists, and historians,² not to mention philosophers/legal scholars,³ theologians,⁴ and social activists/opinion leaders,⁵ have paid much attention to (especially intrastate)

*The author thanks Yinan He, Ned Lebow, Jennifer Lind, and the reviewers and editors of *World Politics* for encouragement and critical comments. Research for this article is partly funded by a “985” 3rd phase grant (No. 2011SHKXZD011) from Fudan University, China.

¹ Bar-Siman-Tov 2004; Kelman 2005; Bar-Tal 2006; Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher.

² Barkan and Karn 2006; Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu.

³ Adorno 1986; Habermas 1988a; Habermas 1988b; Barkan and Karn 2006; Govier 2006.

⁴ Volf 1996; Appleby 2002; Tombs and Liechty 2006.

⁵ E.g., Kristof 1998.

World Politics 63, no. 4 (October 2011), 711–49

Copyright © 2011 Trustees of Princeton University

doi: 10.1017/S0043887111000219

reconciliation. With few exceptions, however, most philosophers/legal scholars, theologians, and activists have been more interested in the moral and ethical issues involved in reconciliation (for example, whether forgiveness is compatible with truth and justice, what kind of justice is most desirable) and how best to achieve reconciliation. By contrast, IR scholars (and, to a lesser extent, sociologists and historians) are more interested in how certain cases of reconciliation have been pursued and why some attempts of reconciliation (for example, the Germany-France case) have been successful whereas others (for example, the Japan-China case) have been much less so. Quite evidently, only with some understanding of these questions can we design better policies for reaching reconciliation.

For both theoretical and practical reasons, this article seeks to encourage the study of reconciliation as a more salient area of inquiry in IR. Building on themes that emerge from six recent volumes, I address four issues in interstate reconciliation: the interplay of group emotions and group politics, the institutionalization of memories, the interplay of domestic politics and international politics, and methodological issues. The first three issues are, I believe, essential for an in-depth understanding of reconciliation, and I advance specific hypotheses and possible leads for further study. Discussion of methodological issues seeks to highlight areas where scholars should be more careful when studying reconciliation.

The rest of this review proceeds in seven sections. The first section prepares the ground by defining several key concepts and clarifies several related issues. The second section provides a necessarily brief summary of the volumes reviewed. The next four sections then discuss the four issues noted above. A concluding section follows.

I. DEFINITIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS

Reconciliation is a dimension in the broader literature on peace studies. Unfortunately, much confusion has arisen from various scales of peace. To avoid further confusion, I recommend the system of labels, concepts, and scales of peace presented in Table 1.

Reconciliation has been used to denote both the process of reaching reconciliation after a major conflict and the state of a bilateral relationship between two parties.⁶ This has created much confusion. In

⁶ For a good earlier discussion of some of the issues discussed here, see Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004.

TABLE 1
DEGREE OF PEACE AND DEGREE OF RECONCILIATION^a

<i>Degree of Peace</i>	<i>Reconciliation If There Was an Armed Conflict</i>	<i>Denial of Past Wrongs by Perpetrators, If Any</i>	<i>Contrition (Apologies and Reparations) by Perpetrators, If Any</i>	<i>Forgiveness from Victims, If Any</i>
Negative / precarious peace Peace is based on deterrence and defense, or pure luck	no reconciliation: no common narratives	denying, white-washing, or even glorifying past wrongs; silence; no coming to terms with the past	little, if any contrition	no forgiveness
Positive peace 1: conditional peace/ shallow peace/ normal peace Peace is based on some rapprochement, in addition to deterrence and defense, or pure luck	shallow reconciliation: few if any common narratives	limited denying whitewashing, less or no glorifying past wrongs; silence evasive on some wrongs; partial coming to terms with the past	some, but very limited contrition	limited forgiveness
Positive peace 2/ stable peace 1/ deep peace 1 Peace is based on a pluralistic security community	deep reconciliation: significant common narratives, strong but limited common identities	no denial, white-washing, and glorifying past wrongs; no silence; almost full coming to terms with the past	deep, if not full, contrition	significant forgiveness
Positive peace 3/ stable peace 2/ deep peace 2; Peace is based on an amalgamated security community (union)	deep reconciliation and beyond: significant common narratives. strong and extensive common identities	no denial, white-washing, and glorifying past wrongs; no silence; full coming to terms with the past	beyond full contrition	significant forgiveness

^a The Arabic numbers after the labels (e.g., positive peace) indicate the degree of peace: the larger the number, the more advanced the peace. In addition to the volumes reviewed here (e.g., He, 12–20; Kupchan, 29–32), this table also critically builds on discussions by Boulding 1978 and the entries by Alexander George, Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, and Benjamin Miller, in Kacowicz et al. 2000. See also Kacowicz 1998, 6–11.

the discussion below, reconciliation denotes the *process* of establishing a warm peace between two former foes. Reconciliation is peace building, not peace itself.

I use reconciliation plus adjectives (for example, shallow, deep) to describe the state of a bilateral relationship. Immediately after a major conflict, the relationship between two former foes is nonreconciliation, or “cold/negative/precarious peace.” After some initial steps toward reconciliation, the relationship reaches “shallow reconciliation,” or “conditional/ normal peace.” Finally, after a period of vigorous and successful reconciliation, the relationship reaches the state of “deep (or robust) reconciliation,” or “warm/deep peace.” The key difference between deep reconciliation and shallow reconciliation is that conflict has become unthinkable in the former but remains thinkable in the latter (see Table 1).

Reconciliation can be either an interpersonal process or an intergroup one. Because a group has its own dynamics psychologically and politically,⁷ intergroup reconciliation is very different from interpersonal reconciliation. Intergroup reconciliation can be further divided into two broad categories: intrastate and interstate. Intrastate reconciliation, usually between two groups *within the same state* after a period of war, discrimination, and other problematic experiences of coexistence, has generated a huge literature.⁸ Yet although the literature on intrastate reconciliation offers important insights for understanding interstate reconciliation, these two processes are fundamentally different.⁹ As such, it is unproductive, if not misleading, to discuss these two types of intergroup reconciliation together. All the volumes reviewed here, except the one by Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher, focus on interstate reconciliation. These volumes also correctly differentiate official (that is, state) level phenomena from societal (that is, elite and popular) phenomena.

It is also important to differentiate the elements and steps of reconciliation from reconciliation itself. Evidently, admission of past wrong, justice, reparation, apology, forgiveness, truth, and cultural exchange are necessary steps or elements of a successful reconciliation. However, just because these steps or elements are indispensable for a successful reconciliation does not mean that they are designed to be part of reconciliation.

Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of apology: defensive, ex-

⁷ Tajfel 1982.

⁸ For a critical review, see Mendeloff 2004.

⁹ Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004, esp. 12–17.

culpatory, and genuine/categorical.¹⁰ Defensive apologies do not admit the wrongdoing: perpetrators insist that they did nothing wrong or justify their past wrongs as unintended consequences brought about by measures aimed at a noble goal. Excusing apologies are slightly better than defensive apologies because perpetrators admit past wrongs. Yet by holding with only excusing apologies, perpetrators still want to absolve themselves of moral responsibility by claiming that their actions were compelled by external situations that were beyond their control. Genuine apologies not only admit one's guilt and accept that one was morally responsible for the past wrongs but also show genuine repentance. Apologies can be issued by a government, a head of state, or nonstate actors, with the government apology carrying the most weight in both interstate and intrastate reconciliations.

II. EMERGING THEMES ON RECONCILIATION

The three single-authored volumes considered in this review are written by IR scholars (He, Kupchan, and Lind) and are explicitly concerned about theory and policy relevance. All three authors employ comparative case studies to advance their argument. He's and Lind's choices of cases complement each other. Whereas Lind compares the case of Germany-France and the case of Japan-South Korea, Yinan He focuses mostly on Japan-China and contrasts it with the case of Germany-Poland. Kupchan casts the widest net: he examines one case (Anglo-America) in detail and nineteen other cases in less detail, and his cases date from the thirteenth century to the present. Spatially, his cases are drawn from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the pre-nineteenth-century North American plain.

Empirically, Lind divides the history of the post-WWII Japanese-South Korean relationship into four periods (pre-1952, 1952-64, 1964-89, and post-1990)¹¹ and the history of post-WWII West German-French relationship into three periods (1945-60s, 1965-90, and post-1990). She also briefly examines the cases of Japan-China, Japan-Australia, and Germany-Britain. Theoretically, Lind identifies perpetrators' remembrance of and contrition for their past wrongs as

¹⁰ Smith 2008, esp. 140-52, provides a detailed discussion on different apologies and their meanings. His categorical apology is roughly equivalent to genuine apology here. Although Govier's (2006, 68-69) "moral apology" is close to Smith's categorical apology, "moral apology" as a label should be rejected because even excusing apologies have moral implication. I address the thornier conceptual and methodological issues for studying the role of different apologies in reconciliation in detail elsewhere.

¹¹ Lind stated only three periods (the last three, 27), but there were really four periods. Her framing might have impacted the development of her arguments.

a key factor in shaping victims' perception of the threat posed by perpetrators, while carefully noting that states also rely on other factors (for example, regime type, membership in international institutions and organizations, and presence or lack of territorial disputes) to gauge others' intentions (pp. 9–10). She advances three key findings. First, a state's denial of past aggression and atrocities fuels distrust of its intentions by its former victims. This distrust, however, does not necessarily translate into a heightened perception of threat because threat is a function of both capabilities and perceived intentions. Second, contrition (mainly apologies) was not absolutely necessary for the remarkable rapprochement between West Germany and France achieved in the 1960s: Germany's much praised deep contrition came *after* the 1970s (p. 102). What really differentiated Germany's coming to terms with its past from that of Japan was that Germany did not deny and white-wash its past wrongs in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War whereas Japan did (pp. 29–39, 105–14; see also Section VI below). Third, apologies tend to generate domestic backlash from the conservatives (this is most prominent in Japan). Worse, such backlash actually worsens the relationship between the perpetrator and its former victims because victims are likely to view the backlash as indicative of malign intentions. As such, Lind argues, not only are apologies unnecessary for pushing states into reconciliation but they may even actually be counterproductive in managing reconciliation.

Lind's central findings challenge the conventional wisdom about the role of public apologies in reconciliation and present a more nuanced picture of it. She shows that while public apologies may push states into *deep* reconciliation (and genuine apologies do send reassuring signals to the perpetrator's former victims), they do not always do so, because public apologies often generate domestic backlash. Her policy advice is thus that states should first try to reconcile without denying past wrongs but withholding public apologizing, and then apologize only when the time seems ripe (pp. 190–96).

Pundits may question Lind's interpretation and policy recommendations on moral grounds because her findings challenge part of our moral convictions. In addition, I see two major methodological problems with her work. First, she seems to use a very imprecise vocabulary to depict contrition (especially apologies) and reconciliation although a more fine-grained, more appropriate vocabulary for these terms is available. For instance, she deploys terms like stable peace, rapprochement, and remarkable reconciliation without defining them rigorously; this creates ambiguities. Lind implies that contrition is not necessary for

reconciliation across the spectrum yet also seems to be unsure whether she wants to assert that *genuine* apologies (or deep contrition) are unnecessary for shallow and deep reconciliation or for shallow reconciliation alone or for something between the two.¹² Second, her narratives show that Japanese whitewashing and glorification of its dark past (besides amnesia) already existed before 1952, when the Japanese government expressed absolutely no contrition. Yet when Japanese officials began to issue merely defensive and exculpatory apologies (especially after 1965), the domestic backlash kicked in, with whitewashing and glorification of Japan's dark past at the heart of the backlash. The goal of the backlash coming from Japanese conservatives has thus been to go back to the days of whitewashing and glorification of its dark past. If so, then the key dynamic is that when there is official silence, denial, and amnesia, there is no backlash (because there is no need for it); backlash comes to the forefront, then, *only* when there is some official contrition. This should not be a surprise, as Lind acknowledges (pp. 181–86; see Section III below). The German case, in turn, presents a starkly contrasting situation: why do we not see the same kind of backlash in Germany even though Germany had atoned so much more? In fact, the “backlash” in Germany was mostly directed against conservatives who sought to ignore, deny, whitewash, forget, “normalize,” and relativize Germany's crimes (Lind, 131–36; Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 124–29; He 79–81, 88–90, 99–103). In such a case, the presence or absence of a backlash is something to be explained rather than merely presented as a fact as if it is so surprising. In this regard, Lind ends her inquiry too abruptly and would have better served her concern for reconciliation had she pursued the question instead of devoting so much discussion to anticipating and countering possible criticisms.¹³

Yinan He uses her two case studies to test her theory of national myth making mostly against the (offensive) realism theory that states cooperate (or reconcile) with each other only when they are facing a common enemy; she also touches on democratic peace theory, commercial peace theory, and the theory of security community.¹⁴ Her theory of national myth making identifies three types of national myths

¹² See, for example, Lind, 102, 124–26, 143, 155–57, 180–81, 186, 188–90; Lind, in Glaser et al. 2009, 360–61. This might have been a major source of differences between Lind and her critics (for example, Berger and Mochizuki, in Glaser et al. 2009). See also the discussion in Section VI below.

¹³ Mochizuki (in Glaser et al. 2009) explored the issue and presented some interesting hypotheses.

¹⁴ The realism theory that He has in mind is more akin to offensive realism because it is based solely on material capabilities (pp. 20–21). For a more detailed discussion on the differences between offensive realism and defensive realism, see Tang 2008; Tang 2010, chap. 1.

that poison interstate relations through both emotion and intention: self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, and others-maligning (pp. 27–28).¹⁵ She emphasizes mass education and popular media as the two primary channels for making and spreading national myths. The spread of toxic national myths then comes back to constrain the interaction between the perpetrator and its former victims through three mechanisms: (1) negative emotions and perceived intentions worsen the overall climate of opinion regarding each other; (2) a public experiencing negative emotions and perceiving malignant intentions on the part of another state puts pressure on its state to adopt hard-line policies on specific issues; and (3) holding negative emotions and perceiving malignant intentions on the part of another state heightens elites' threat perception and their willingness to risk conflict with the other state (pp. 25–34).¹⁶ Drawing on empirical testing, He contends that joint history research and the restitution measures *followed* are the key pathways for former enemies to reach historical settlements and move toward deep reconciliation (pp. 35–40).

Yinan He divides the Germany-Poland case into four phases (1945–mid-1960s, mid-1960s–1970s, 1980s, and post-1990s) and the Japan-China case, too, into four phases (1950s–60s, 1972–81, 1981–89, and post-1990). Her empirical studies generally support her national myth-making theory. She shows that the two dyads were in a similar mode of national myth making in the 1950s–60s: the two sides in each dyad had engineered and promulgated diverging national myths that poisoned their relations. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the two dyads began to diverge. Whereas Germany and Poland began to construct convergent national narratives of history and memory, Japan and China did not embark on a similar path, even though both had a common foe in the Soviet Union and a common ally in the United States since the early 1970s. Instead, national myths in Japan and China diverged further and eventually, in the 1980s, began to collide openly, reinforced by disputes over other unresolved issues (for example, sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku island, Japan's greater international role, the U.S.-Japan alliance). Not surprisingly, the result has been that Germany and Poland have reached deep reconciliation today, whereas Japan and China remain stuck in the past.¹⁷

¹⁵ Regarding intention, He's study echoes Lind's finding that a state's lack of genuine apology for its past wrongs primes its former victims to believe that the state remains a malignant state.

¹⁶ Yinan He notes that a negative perception of emotions does not necessarily heighten elites' threat perception and willingness to risk conflict regarding another country (pp. 33–34). Her conclusion may reflect an incomplete synthesis of emotion and (rational) politics. See Section III below.

¹⁷ He, 291–99. On the desirability of a shared narrative of the past, see also Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004.

I have two major criticisms of He's thesis. First, although she seems to suggest that states should first engage in joint history research and produce a convergent historical narrative about the past and then deploy restitution measures, it is unclear whether such a framing is sound or whether her empirical work bears it out (compare Kupchan). Other possibilities exist: the two measures work together to propel states into deep reconciliation, and/or joint history research comes after some restitution. Moreover, some cases of deep reconciliation (for example, Germany and Britain) do not seem to contain joint history research. Second, although He sets up her theory of national myth making (which is akin to social constructivism) against a realism theory of reconciliation, this may not be a productive way to advance our understanding of reconciliation. As He's own work and that of others have shown, reconciliation in the real world usually has its beginnings in realism: instrumental calculation was often pivotal in propelling states into mending fences. Moreover, "realist" measures—especially reassurance—are the key instruments for jump-starting *rapprochement* (as shallow reconciliation), and only at a later stage would constructivist measures (for example, reshaping the image of a former opponent and forging a common identity) kick in.¹⁸ And realism theories such as the security dilemma and reassurance can actually readily accommodate constructivist factors and mechanisms such as shaping identity and reducing myths.¹⁹ Hence, both (defensive) realism and constructivism have something to say about reconciliation. While pitting the two approaches against each other may be of some academic interest, it may be irrelevant, if not counterproductive, for understanding and engineering real reconciliation.

Kupchan's theoretical enterprise is as ambitious as the scope of his empirical inquiry is impressive. Eclectically drawing from the *Deutschian* tradition on the security community, the English School (on international society), and constructivism, Kupchan strives to synthesize realism, (commercial) liberalism, and constructivism into a coherent framework, while rejecting the notion that democracy is a necessary condition for stable peace. He argues that the zone of stable peace can take three forms or levels: *rapprochement*, security community, and union. Kupchan identifies four phases in the making of stable peace: unilateral accommodation, reciprocal restraint, societal integration, and the generation of new narratives and identities.²⁰ He further under-

¹⁸ See, for example, Adler and Barnett 1998, 37–59. Lind; He; Kupchan, 17–21; Ripsman 2005; and Nadler and Shnabel, in Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher 2008. For reassurance, see Kydd 2005, chap. 7; Tang 2010, chap. 5.

¹⁹ Kydd 2005; Tang 2010, chap. 2; Tang 2011b.

²⁰ These four phases can also be understood as four mechanisms in the making of stable peace, operating in sequential order. On mechanisms, see Bunge 1997.

scores three conditions/factors that propel the process of constructing a stable peace: domestic institutionalized constraint (facilitating but not necessary), compatible social order (necessary),²¹ and cultural commonality (necessary). He emphasizes that domestic institutionalized constraint rather than regime type per se (for example, liberal democracy) is the key to understanding the onset of stable peace (pp. 2–3, 6–8, 13–14, 54–60). He also speculates that three factors often trigger the making of stable peace: geopolitical necessity, a preponderant state as an anchor, and policy entrepreneurship (pp. 66–67). Most valuably, Kupchan stresses that it is inadequate to focus merely on the progression of stable peace: we also need to understand how stable peace (including the security community) regresses (pp. 71–72).

Kupchan gives his readers a lot of material to ponder, including a new set of labels. At first glance, because Kupchan defines “a zone of stable peace” as “a grouping of strategically proximate states among which war has become unthinkable” (p. 29), his “union” is Deutsch’s “amalgamated security community” and his “security community” is Deutsch’s “pluralistic security community” (pp. 21–26, 29–32). But on closer examination one finds that this is not the case because for Kupchan, both “security community” and “union” can unravel (pp. 68–72, 183–88, 284–86).²² His vocabulary creates much confusion. For instance, he identifies the Concert of Europe and the Gulf Cooperation Council as cases of “security communities” that eventually unraveled (chap. 5). Likewise, he labels the United Arab Republic (1958–61) and the Senegambian Confederation (1982–89) as “unions” (of stable peace) that also eventually backslid into conflict (chap. 6). Mostly evidently, most of us do not associate rapprochement with “stable peace” as Kupchan does (pp. 8–9), but rather most associate it with “conditional/normal peace” (as shallow reconciliation).²³ These conceptual drawbacks make it difficult to assess the validity of Kupchan’s many sensible theses and to locate his work within the broader literature on peace building, reconciliation, and the security community.

Moreover, Kupchan treats most of the cases in his book superficially. As such, he may have missed some straightforward explanations for why some cases of rapprochement and “security communities” even-

²¹ According to Kupchan, compatibility of social order depends on three dimensions: distribution of power across classes, distribution of power across ethnic and racial groups, and the organization of economic production and commercial activity (pp. 7, 60). Cf. Adler and Barnett 1998, 51.

²² We will not be surprised if some cases of rapprochement (for example, China and the Soviet Union) unravel.

²³ Cf. Kacowicz 1998, 6–11; Adler and Barnett 1998, 30–37; He 2009, 12–20. Indeed, Kupchan’s discussion strongly suggests that rapprochement does not spell “(zone of) stable peace.”

tually unraveled. Can we not just explain the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the simple fact that both states were offensive realist states, as Kupchan himself seems to agree (pp. 134–57), rather than with his scheme of three factors? Likewise, can we not just explain the folding of the Concert of Europe with the simple fact that all major states within the Concert too were offensive realist states (as a deep cause), rather than blaming it solely on the revolution of 1848, which might have been merely a triggering event (pp. 188–201, 236–53)?²⁴ At the very least, on the basis of the evidence Kupchan provides, it is hard to tell which explanation is sounder.

Of the three edited volumes, two (Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu; Hasegawa and Togo) are mostly the work of historians and sociologists, and their coverage too complements each other. Whereas the Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu volume examines memories of European states without directly engaging reconciliation, the Hasegawa and Togo volume examines memories of Northeast Asian states in the context of searching for reconciliation. Authors in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu focus on “institutional memory,” defined as memories that have been produced, transmitted, and enforced by politics/power, and they explicitly seek to uncover the politics behind memories.²⁵ The cases cover various aspects of memories about World War II in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, and the Soviet Union–Russia, paying close attention to roles, identities, cultural products, and discourse in the shaping of memory. A key theme that emerges from the volume is that these states’ contestation of memories (and postwar identities) invariably revolves around their various roles during the war.

With an eye to policy relevance, the Hasegawa and Togo volume takes a mostly issue-oriented approach rather than a country case studies approach. In their introduction, Hasegawa and Togo provide some fascinating background to their project, highlighting the volatility surrounding the past in Northeast Asia. The rest of the volume is divided into four parts. The first part provides three broad and different perspectives on Japan’s history problem (Rozman, Togo), with a comparative eye to the European experience (Berger). The second part examines three key issues that divided Japan and its three key victims (China and

²⁴ Kupchan actually underscores the key role of benign intentions in various places (e.g., pp. 391, 394). On why offensive realist states cannot achieve genuine cooperation, see Tang 2008; Tang 2010, chap. 4.

²⁵ Lebow differentiates “institutional memories” from collective memories. My hunch is that almost all collective memories are the product of institutionalization, thus to some extent, institutional. Hence, I use the term “collective memories” throughout.

the two Koreas): textbooks and the teaching of WWII histories (Mitani, Kim), the Yasukuni Shrine (Tanaka), and the “comfort women” (Togo). The third part contains three chapters that focus on the role of Japan in the making and the recent surge of nationalism in China and South Korea (Jin, Zhu, and Park). Finally, the fourth part deals with the United States and Russia as “bystanders” (Straub, Hasegawa). Although the volume does not cover in depth at least four key issues (that is, the Nanjing Massacre, forced labor by Japan during WWII, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty), it nonetheless reveals the extraordinary complexity and challenges in searching for reconciliation in Northeast Asia.

The third edited volume (Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher) is exclusively the work of social psychologists focusing on intrastate intergroup relations, with the one exception being the Israel-Palestine conflict. The editors begin by imposing the dichotomy of socioemotional reconciliation versus instrumental reconciliation (chap. 2, esp. 40–45). After the first part (two chapters), which sets the tone of the volume, the second part (seven chapters) focuses on socioemotional reconciliation and the third part (again seven chapters) focuses on instrumental reconciliation. The fourth part deals with programs for promoting intergroup reconciliation, and Morton Deutsch’s contribution concludes the volume. Most of the twenty chapters in the volume aim at theoretical development and/or prescriptions regarding various aspects of reconciliation (for example, apology, forgiveness, guilt, justice, common identities) with psychological experiments, although four chapters draw on evidence from some actual cases of reconciliation (Chile, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, South Africa, and Israel-Palestine). Some of the themes that stand out in this impressive collection include the role of social categorization, collective guilt, different needs by perpetrators and victims, respect, and identity reshaping in reconciliation (Miron and Branscombe, Nadler and Shnabel, Pratto and Glasford, Janoff-Bulman and Werther).

In addition to the crippling defect of taking a largely apolitical approach (see Section IV below), the Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher volume suffers from several dubious dichotomies. Consider, for example, the dichotomy of socioemotional reconciliation versus instrumental reconciliation (Nadler and Shnabel, 41–45). At best, it corresponds to Kelman’s notion of conflict resolution and reconciliation or, more appropriately, to two stages of reconciliation (shallow and deep), as the two authors themselves admit. At worst, it muddles things because reconciliation necessarily involves both emotional and instrumental aspects. Social psychologists’ pitting realist theory against symbolic/psychological

need theory when it comes to intergroup relations is as unproductive as IR theorists' pitting realism against constructivism. Similarly, the notion that victims desire to regain a sense of power whereas perpetrators desire to regain a sense of morality is difficult to sustain (pp. 45–53). This notion already assumes that perpetrators experience a sense of guilt. Worse, it assumes that victims have no interest in making a greater claim of morality.

III. PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS IN INTERGROUP RELATIONS

A group has its own unique dynamics, both politically and psychologically.²⁶ For much of the past century, social psychology has focused on the cognitive aspect of group psychology but neglected its emotional aspects. In recent years, social psychologists have (re)discovered the role of emotions in intergroup relations.²⁷

Following social psychology in the 1960–80s, much of the initial importation of that discipline to IR was based on a rationalist cognitive approach and, as a result, has ignored emotion, whether individual or group. Following the rediscovery of emotion in neurophysiology and social psychology, many IR theorists have also called for taking emotion seriously in their own discipline and bringing cognition and emotion together for understanding international politics.²⁸ Quite evidently, emotions like ethnocentrism, fear, hatred, concern for honor, prestige, and status are important drivers of our behavior.²⁹

Overall, the interaction between group psychology and group politics, rather than a consideration of each of the two aspects standing alone or against each other, seems to be the key for determining the success or failure of reconciliation. As such, we must bring psychology (including emotion) and politics together when trying to understand reconciliation (He, 30–34).

When it comes to reconciliation, psychologists are mostly interested in (educating people about) how things should be done but not so much why things have been or have not been done *politically*. Psychologists, tending as they do to overemphasize psychology and ignore politics, essentially do not engage with political science. Most evidently, the Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher volume contains no entries from political scientists. Meanwhile, although Oliner notes that certain apologies

²⁶ Tajfel 1982.

²⁷ Mackie and Smith 2002; Iyer and Leach 2008.

²⁸ See, for example, Crawford 2000; Jervis 2004; Lebow 2008; Mercer 2005; He.

²⁹ Horowitz 1985; Lebow 2008.

were ineffective, he fails to explore the political (and psychological) reasons why more “effective” apologies were not made and why perhaps some “effective” apologies were deemed ineffective by the other side.³⁰

Like a mirror image, political scientists and sociologists are interested in what has (not) been done and what can (not) be done *politically and socially*, but not so much in why certain things cannot be easily done *psychologically*. Thus, Thomas Berger noted the three approaches (that is, historical, political, and cultural) in the study of historical narratives, leaving out the psychological approach.³¹ Although political scientists and sociologists often cite some psychology literature when studying reconciliation, they have yet to connect the politics of interstate reconciliation with some of the most prominent group psychological traits.

Most prominently, ethnocentrism—the most critical psychological trait in any interstate (or interethnic group) relations³²—is rarely mentioned in the political science writings on reconciliation. Yet once we bring ethnocentrism and politics together, we can construct a unifying explanatory framework that can synthesize some seemingly divergent findings and point to some directions for further investigation (see Figure 1). This framework emphasizes that ethnocentrism creates needs and pressures to which politics (by elites and the public) often submit and submission then comes back to strengthen ethnocentrism. The typical result is mutual frustration, detestation, and hostility,³³ and only decisive political moves can break out of this vicious cycle.

Ethnocentrism is egocentrism at the group level: its essence is that we want to maintain a positive image of our own group relative to other groups. It is omnipresent: all ethnic groups are ethnocentric. Thus, it is no surprise that states often resort to myth making to shore up their egoistic identities (He), either by projecting a positive image or rejecting a negative image (these two measures are two sides of the same coin). Ethnocentrism underpins myth making, and myth making reinforces ethnocentrism.

Ethnocentrism facilitates the institutionalization of conflict and hinders reconciliation by driving groups to whitewash their inglorious and infamous (real) past while glorifying their glorious (real or imagined) past. This contrasting pattern is the starkest between perpetrators and victims, with those “in-between” countries—those that had been

³⁰ Oliner 2008

³¹ Berger, in Hasegawa and Togo, 19–23.

³² LeVine and Campbell 1972.

³³ On this part of the dynamics, see also the contributions by Pratto and Glasford; Janoff-Bulman and Werther; and Crocker et al., in Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher.




FIGURE 1
ETHNOCENTRISM, MYTH MAKING, AND A VICIOUS SPIRAL

victims, active collaborators with injustice, or silent accomplices—behaving with a mixture of these two basic dynamics.³⁴

Perpetrators are often reluctant to apologize and admit guilt. Instead, they simply wish the victims to forgive and forget so that the perpetrators' (infamous) past can simply go away. Slightly better is that perpetrators often take refuge in the so-called "apology fatigue," after some half-hearted apologies. The worst is when perpetrators accentuate their own sense of innocence or even victimhood via cherry-picking the past.³⁵ Doing so serves the purposes of (1) protecting the group's collective identity, (2) forging a positive and unifying national identity while avoiding demoralizing the public; (3) mobilizing the public for postconflict building; and (4) providing a legitimate foundation for evading responsibility. And if victims demand sincere apologies, perpetrators often issue merely defensive and excusing apologies, and even these half-hearted apologies are denounced as unpatriotic and unwarranted by many within the perpetrator countries (Lind).

Thus, in Germany, Adenauer was more for "rebuilding" than for "repenting."³⁶ In Japan, right-wing politicians (and the general public) had been extremely reluctant to repent and apologize. Instead, they chose to forget or even glorify Japan's imperial past (Lind; He). Austrians for their part wanted to forge a positive image of their country based on a supposedly "coerced" loss of independence and heroic resistance against Hitler rather than a negative image of willing collaborator. And Italians wanted to retain their self-image as "good folks" (*brava gente*) and victims of Nazism, while conveniently forgetting that Mussolini was in the vanguard of fascism and that Italy actively sought glories in conquest.³⁷

In contrast, victims tend to institutionalize victimhood and heroic resistance unconsciously and unintentionally. Doing so serves the purpose of (1) forging a unifying and positive national identity; (2) mobilizing the public for nation/state-building after the conflict; (3) providing a legitimate foundation for seeking apologies from the perpetrator; (4) gaining and bolstering one's claim to moral righteousness and political legitimacy; and (5) boosting one's (severely) wounded collective ego.

In France, Gaullists emphasized victimhood, heroic resistance, and liberation but downplayed Frenchmen's widespread acceptance of Nazi

³⁴ Lebow, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 16–21.

³⁵ Lebow, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 31–32.

³⁶ Moeller 2001; Lind.

³⁷ Uhl and Fogu, respectively, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu.

rule, especially the collaboration with the Nazis in the ethnic cleansing of Jews.³⁸ In Poland, the emphasis was similarly on Polish resistance while essentially ignoring the treatment of Poland's Jewish population. In the Soviet Union, the discourse and memory of the Second World War was mostly about the Soviet Union's heroic resistance and enormous sacrifice in the great Patriotic War, with nothing said about Stalin's conspiracy with Hitler. In South Korea, the dark period under Japanese occupation (1905–45) was simply swept under the rug for much of the time.³⁹

By the same token, victims are often reluctant to forgive even if perpetrators issue persistent and sincere apologies and provide some form of reparations. This essentially means that victims generally withhold a more positive image from the perpetrators. In many cases, calls for forgiveness face domestic backlash among the victims, just as calls for apologies face domestic backlash among the perpetrators. Thus, for much of the time, any suggestion for forgiving the Germans was considered by surviving Jews to be betrayal. Indeed, the agreement between Israel and Germany “almost caused a civil war” in Israel.⁴⁰ More recently, when two Chinese commentators called for some forgiveness toward Japan, they were roundly attacked as unpatriotic.⁴¹

In sum, much of our reluctance to “come to terms with the past” is underpinned by our need to protect our collective ego. Ignoring these powerful psychological barriers to reconciliation, political scientists often failed to understand why certain approaches may not work or may even generate undesired effects (such as backlash). Moreover, they have failed to grasp that a key challenge in effecting reconciliation is to overcome these barriers by using political and psychological means. In order to understand (both interstate and intrastate) reconciliation adequately, politics and psychology must be brought together. After all, Tajfel had long argued that the psychology literature on intergroup relations should combine the realist theory of group conflict that emphasizes the material and political dimension and the symbolic theory of group conflict that emphasizes the psychological dimension of group relations.⁴²

Politicians often employ psychology for instrumental reasons. Na-

³⁸ Golsan, Orla-Bukowska, and Wolfe, respectively, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu.

³⁹ Cumings 1997, chap. 3.

⁴⁰ Segev 2000.

⁴¹ Gries 2005.

⁴² Tajfel 1982.

tionalistic rhetoric and moves, known as ethnic outbidding in ethnic conflict, are usually more popular than conciliatory ones.⁴³ More critically, politicians have relied regularly on fear and hatred (rather than assurances of security) to mobilize the populace because (they know that) those emotions are more effective at arousing people than are calls for compromise and reconciliation. This explains why apologies and forgiveness are often attacked as unpatriotic whereas nationalistic rhetoric is praised as patriotic. Consequently, politicians are generally reluctant to deploy conciliatory tones and apologies unless they have very strong moral convictions.

There exists a powerful tool that can link group psychology (including emotions) with group politics. This tool is the all-too-familiar but still underappreciated (and often misunderstood) theory of security dilemma and spiral. The theory of security dilemma and spiral has always emphasized the interplay of group psychology and politics that can drive a bilateral relationship into a vicious spiral. Although the theory of security dilemma and spiral has traditionally emphasized fear and misperception, it can readily accommodate other psychological aspects such as ethnocentrism, hatred, concern for status, and so on.⁴⁴ Moreover, because the other side of security dilemma and spiral is reassurance, a theory of cooperation building via reassurance that integrates psychology with politics is a powerful tool for understanding reconciliation.⁴⁵ When properly understood, the theory of security dilemma/spiral and reassurance holds out the promise of a more integrative theory of conflict and cooperation.⁴⁶

Reconciliation thus has important implications for making political psychology a genuinely interdisciplinary science. Although political psychology has gained a legitimate place in political science and IR, it has been mostly about importing psychology into politics rather than striving for an organic synthesis of psychology and politics. Much of the literature was about how certain psychological traits often predispose decision makers to certain errors and biases, thus making conflict likely and cooperation difficult. An equally important question, however, is how effective politics can be used to overcome our psychological barriers in pursuing cooperation. It is thus time for psychologists and political scientists to work for a more organic synthesis of psychology and

⁴³ Horowitz 1985.

⁴⁴ For a recent critical review of the literature on the security dilemma and a more rigorous reformulation, see Tang 2010, chap. 2, and the references cited there.

⁴⁵ Kydd 2005, chap. 7; Tang 2010, chap. 5; Tang 2011b.

⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, Lind, He, and Kupchan, as IR scholars, all employ the security dilemma and reassurance in their work, to various degrees.

politics. Indeed, because social psychology is indispensable for social construction, the more or less constructivist approach taken by He can be readily adapted in the service of moving toward such a synthesis.

In this context, some harsh words for social psychologists studying reconciliation may be in order. They obviously care about reconciliation deeply. Unfortunately, most of them seem to have been living in a world without politics: for them, reconciliation is a purely psychological process. For instance, Walter Stephan (in Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher) lists a host of postconflict societal conditions that hamper reconciliation without bothering even to mention that some of those factors are political. Moreover, he fails to recognize that most of the (psychological?) programs cannot take place without political settlements (*ex ante*) and political will. Likewise, Worchel and Coutant (in Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher, 427) assert that “[t]he underlying characteristic of ethnic conflict is fear.” They seem to have ignored the voluminous literature on (real) ethnic conflict that stresses—in addition to emotions such as envy, fear, and hatred—politics as an indispensable driving force.⁴⁷ Because social psychologists essentially ignore politics and thus reconciliation in the real world, many of their policy prescriptions for reconciliation look quixotic and irrelevant.⁴⁸ To provide truly relevant policy prescriptions, social psychologists of reconciliation urgently need to grasp the interaction between politics and psychology, thus making themselves genuine *political* psychologists rather than merely social psychologists. Ultimately, although psychology is an integral part of any reconciliation, no reconciliation is possible without politics and only politics can overcome the psychological barriers in reconciliation.⁴⁹

IV. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In sharp contrast to the growing literature of neoclassical realism on conflict,⁵⁰ the study of the domestic politics of cooperation has lagged far behind. Reconciliation as a specific and more difficult form of cooperation is no exception. Although none of the volumes examined

⁴⁷ Horowitz 1985.

⁴⁸ And this lack of appreciation of politics very much explains why Herbert Kelman’s noble effort to bring Israelis and Palestinians together via social settings cannot but meet frustration and disappointment (Kelman, in Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher). Incidentally, the editors of the Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher volume claim that “social psychology is uniquely equipped to further such understanding [on how to promote intergroup reconciliation] and provide the conceptual background for social action” (p. 11). Social psychologists need to learn modesty first.

⁴⁹ Bar-Simon-Tov’s (2004) effort to bring social psychology and other social sciences is thus laudable.

⁵⁰ Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro 2009. For a critique of this competitive bias, see Tang 2009.

makes an explicit effort to theorize the impact of the interplay of domestic politics and international politics on reconciliation, that interplay stands out as another key to understanding the failure and success of reconciliation in all the cases that have been examined in detail.

Let us start with the impact of international (and regional) politics upon the domestic politics of reconciliation. Almost all of the authors have noted that the cold war, a confrontation with a heavy ideological and identity-related undertone between the West and the East, had severely hindered reconciliation between the defeated Axis powers and their former victims, regardless of which camp the victims were in.

Obviously, for the perpetrators, when victims are in the opposite camp, reconciliation has little practical value. Moreover, both superpowers had actively discouraged and even tried to obstruct reconciliation between the two Germanys, Italy, and Japan on the one side and their respective victims on the other side, especially when the victims were in the other camp.

When victims were in the same camp, reconciliation was encouraged but only up to a point. Indeed, having a common opponent may reduce states' incentives and resolve to forge a deep reconciliation. Because the People's Republic of China (PRC) was so fearful of the Soviet Union after 1969, the PRC eagerly sought Japan's support for the clause of "antihegemony" (the code word for anti-Soviet Union) and thus had little incentive to pursue a more forthright apology from Japan when China and Japan negotiated their Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1972.⁵¹ Instrumental calculation triumphed over moral consideration.

Having a powerful common ally has not always been a blessing for reconciliation either. During the cold war the two superpowers had often pressured their weaker allies who were adversaries to patch things up in order to shore up solidarity within the two camps. The Soviet Union had actively pressured the former East Germany and its victims in Eastern Europe (for example, Poland and Czechoslovakia) to mend fences, thus obstructing genuine reconciliation between them. Like a mirror image, the United States had actively pressured the Republic of China (ROC) to drop its opposition to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) so that Japan and the ROC could team up in containing the spread of communism from the PRC. The same argument applies to the case of Japan and Australia and to the case of Japan and South

⁵¹ Lee 1973; Rozman, in Hasegawa and Togo; He, chap. 4.

Korea for much of the time since the Korean War (Lind 2008; see also Rozman, Straub, in Hasegawa and Togo 2008).

Domestic politics certainly has an impact on the international politics of reconciliation. In this context, change of political leadership is a paramount factor. In both Germany and Japan, the more forthright apologies came after the more liberal wing of the political spectrum came to power (the Social Democratic Party led by Willy Brandt in Germany, a non-LDP coalition led by Morihiro Hosokawa from the New Party and the Japan Socialist Party led by Tomiichi Murayama in Japan), however briefly. Because a key in reconciliation is how to overcome domestic resistance to reconciliation, another major factor is generational change. Although Willy Brandt's moral conviction should not be slighted, the generational change in FRG certainly made his *Ostpolitik* more acceptable, strong domestic opposition in some sections of the population notwithstanding (Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu). Likewise, as the Gaullist generation faded away, breaking the taboos on France's complex roles in WWII became easier and made possible Jacques Chirac's attempt to reconcile with the Jewish people (Golsan, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu).

A more complex case might have been the use and abuse of the history of the anti-Japanese war (1937–45) in both the PRC and the ROC. During but especially immediately after the Chinese Civil War of 1945–49, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalists Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) competed for internal legitimacy and international recognition.⁵² PRC textbooks on history lauded the CCP's contribution and marginalized the contribution of the KMT and its major allies (that is, the United States) in winning the war whereas the ROC did exactly the opposite. Each side painted the other as unpatriotic, rather than pressuring Japan to apologize and pay compensation for China's enormous war losses (He, 133–40, 149–56). Worse, both sides tried to downplay the atrocities of the Japanese army for the sake of retaining/gaining Japan's recognition.

In sum, reconciliation provides a fertile ground for studying the impact on international cooperation building of the interplay of domestic politics and international politics, perhaps precisely because reconciliation represents a more difficult form of cooperation building. Several leads emerge from the neoclassical realism literature on cooperation building and the two-level game literature. In terms of domestic fac-

⁵² Eykholt 2000; Yoshida 2000; Rose 2005, 41–49; He, chap. 3.

tors, we should consider at least the following: regime type, regime security, social cohesion (at both elite and public levels), and leaders' preferences.⁵³ In terms of international or regional factors, we should consider at least the following: distribution of power, coalitions of regimes within a region, the presence or absence of an external power, the presence of regional organizations, regional identities, and global norms (for example, human rights after WWII).

In terms of possible theoretical leads, the following hypotheses warrant further testing with cases of reconciliation. It is well known that leaders who share a worldview and a moral vision (whatever those may be) need each other: two moderates can point to each other's friendly moves and reciprocating moves to justify their own moderate policies; in turn, two hard-liners can point to each other's unfriendly moves (often provoked by the other side) to justify their own hard-line policies. When two leaders do not share a worldview, the moderate leader will have a hard time maintaining his/her course and may eventually lose his/her grip on power.⁵⁴ Hence, leaders not only impact reconciliation but reconciliation also impacts leaders' political fortunes.⁵⁵ Thus, although like-minded leaders are not necessarily attracted to each other, only they are positioned to move forward in pursuit of cooperation and reconciliation. Another interesting possibility might be that states' desire for positive recognition (regionally or globally) is an important driver of repentance on the part of perpetrators.⁵⁶ Such a possibility can be tied to the more recent literature emphasizing that states' desire for others to recognize their legitimacy can reduce conflict and facilitate cooperation.⁵⁷ Finally, existing studies suggest that mature democracy may be a necessary—though not sufficient (recall the Japan–South Korea case)—factor for underpinning deep reconciliation (He, 90–114).⁵⁸ The reason is that only mature (or maturing?) democracies do not need to scapegoat their former enemies, and only mature democracies can

⁵³ E.g., Soligen 1998; Schultz 2005; and Putnam 1988. Because the neoclassical realism literature has mostly focused on international conflict, it has a strong "competition bias," and studies of reconciliation provide a much needed and powerful correction to this bias. Moreover, most neoclassical realists have so far failed to make leaders' preferences as a key variable. This is a major omission. See Section IV below.

⁵⁴ Schultz 2005.

⁵⁵ For a good example, see the case of Hu Yaobang in China in 1984–86 (He, chap. 5; Tanaka, in Hasegawa and Togo, 123–28).

⁵⁶ On this possibility, see the exchange between Berger and Lind, in Glaser et al. 2009. Lind's narratives actually strongly support the position that regional integration and common identities are critical for France's relaxed views of Germany, after the 1960s, and especially after the reunification of Germany (chap. 3).

⁵⁷ Larson and Shevchenko 2010.

⁵⁸ Lind 2010 is moving in such a direction. See also Lind, 96; Kupchan, 25–60.

face their dark pasts through ruptures with history. This possibility provides an interesting twist to the theory of democratic peace: how democracies build peace after major conflicts.

V. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MEMORIES AND RECONCILIATION

All ethnic groups and states possess some kind of collective (or group) memory, “a set of recollections attributable to some overarching group mind that could recall past events in (admittedly poorly understood) ways in which we believe that individuals recall the past.”⁵⁹ In the context of reconciliation, the key collective memory is the collective memory of past conflict(s), a memory that can be understood as the ideational residue of a conflict long after the actual conflict has ended in the physical sense. Collective memories are often very resilient, partly because they form part of our (collective) identities. Identities also come back to shape our memories: memories and identities thus mutually constitute each other. More importantly, memories (and thus identities, as constructivists would emphasize) return to constrain politics. In the context of reconciliation, myth-making elites often come to discover that the myths they have created come back to limit their policy choices when they wish to shift policies: historical ideas, that is, can take on a life of their own (He, 287–91).

All collective memories, including the collective memory of past conflict(s), are products of myth making/de-myth making, institutionalization, and socialization. The institutionalization of memories, like institutional change, is power based and thus a political process.⁶⁰ I shall highlight two key aspects of this process—namely, agents and channels—that should be investigated more closely.

AGENTS: LEADERS AND PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS

Reconciliations are engineered by real people (or agents). Among these real people, two groups, states’ leaders and public intellectuals, are perhaps most prominent.

After the coming of the Waltzian structural revolution in IR, the interest of political scientists and IR theorists in *personal* leadership has essentially disappeared,⁶¹ other than that some mention the leadership of hegemonic states in forging international institutions.⁶² This is un-

⁵⁹ Klein 2000, 135; see also Olick 1999.

⁶⁰ Müller 2002. For a general theory of institutional change, see Tang 2011a.

⁶¹ For an exception, see Samuels 2005.

⁶² I use leadership in a morally neutral sense: leadership is merely the ability to shape political outcomes.

fortunate because leadership (and the competition for it) is an integral part of any politics. Works reviewed here indicate that state leaders with strong moral convictions and critical political skills have played a vital role in engineering successful reconciliation (or, for that matter, in hindering, if not sabotaging, an ongoing reconciliation process). Put simply, successful reconciliation requires effective leadership.⁶³

It is useful to divide leadership into two broader kinds: moral and instrumental. Moral leadership means that a leader tries to lead the people toward a more just outcome with a strong moral conviction. Yet moral leadership alone is never enough for reaching a goal. An effective leader must also exercise instrumental leadership, which can be understood most simply as tactical proficiency in getting things done. In other words, besides being able to inspire his or her subjects, an effective leader must be good at the nitty-gritty of daily politics: he or she must convince, cajole, threaten, and buy over (some of) his/her subjects.

In reconciliation, these two forms of leadership on occasion collide. For instance, while Adenauer and de Gaulle might have stabilized the fragile situation between France and Germany after WWII, they might also have delayed the process of coming to terms with the past in both countries, intentionally and unintentionally. Focusing on reconstruction, Adenauer delayed Germany's more thorough repentance about its Nazi past. Likewise, focusing on rebuilding the French national psyche, de Gaulle delayed France's facing up to its Vichy past and thereby it ability to reach a deep reconciliation with the Jewish people.

Public intellectuals also play a critical role in engineering or hindering reconciliation, especially in democracies. Leading intellectuals, by virtue of their status, prestige, and visibility, can shape the discourse and thus the course of justice. In Germany, Adorno's and Habermas's intervention in the historical debate partly thwarted revisionists' attempts to bleach Germany's Nazi past.⁶⁴ And a small group of German legal experts and historians was instrumental in shaping a more forthcoming repentance among Germans in the 1960s (Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 114–15; He, 88–90).

Leaders and public intellectuals also interact with each other. Intellectuals exercise power over the public when they oppose or support leaders' initiatives. Leaders also inevitably need cooperative intellectuals to shape public opinion. After all, those counterarguments that tend to deny and whitewash, if not justify and glorify, past crimes have often started out as "scholarly research," whether it was German revision-

⁶³ Bargal and Sivan 2004 made a good preliminary start regarding this important topic.

⁶⁴ Adorno 1986; Habermas 1988a; Habermas 1988b.

ists' conjecture that Hitler was merely learning from Stalin's purge or Japanese rightists' whitewash of their country's imperial past and war crimes. In Japan, for example, as the cold war loomed larger, purges of militarists ceased and right-wing intellectuals were protected and promoted whereas leftist intellectuals (communists and socialists) who called for moral repentance were purged or suppressed. The result was that voices for reconciliation with Japan's former victims (for example, Masao Maruyama and Ienaga Saburo) have been few and outmatched. Consequently, memories of past crimes were largely banished from the public discourse and most Japanese were happy to get on with forgetting rather than repenting. Likewise, in Italy, with only symbolic purges of fascists and their collaborators, most noncommunist politicians of the Italian Republic were happily busy with whitewashing rather than coming to terms with their dark past, at least until the 1990s. In such a social context, a myth—propagated by the leading philosopher Benedetto Croce—that fascism was “a parenthesis in Italian history and an external virus that had penetrated its healthy historical body (...) sustained and legitimized both public amnesia regarding the *ventennio* [the dark two decades of fascism, 1922–43] and the historicization of the *biennio* [the resistance of Nazi occupation from July 1943 to April 1945 in German-occupied northern Italy] as the true face of Italian national identity” (Fogu, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 151–53, quote from 149).

In sum, most works reviewed here touch upon the roles of leaders and public intellectuals in reconciliation. Yet these individuals' roles are often only a small part of the narrative. Further studies should probe the exact roles of these individuals in engineering or hindering reconciliation and thus provide lessons for future attempts at reconciliation. There is no need to lionize leaders and intellectuals, but relegating them to the margins surely does not help us understand reconciliation.

CHANNELS: MEDIA AND EDUCATION

If reshaping collective memories of the past is central to reconciliation and reconciliation can be achieved only via communication, then two communicative channels, media and education, are of paramount importance, as shown by all the books reviewed here.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ See also the chapters by Gildea; Levy and Dierkes, in Müller 2002. A project led by Gi-Wook Sin and Daniel Snider at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and Stanford University thus seeks to examine both channels (more specifically, history textbooks and cinema) in the context of Northeast Asia. For a progress report, see Snider 2008. The Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific project of the Sigur Center at George Washington University, codirected by Mike Mochizuki, will soon publish an edited volume titled, *Reconciling Rivals: War, Memory, and Security in East Asia*.

For victims, the media (mainly television, cinema, newspapers, and literature) create a myth of national resistance by remembering the dark past and valorizing the heroic resistance/struggle against the perpetrator (He). Thus, in France, Gaullists worked hard to generate and maintain the myth of universal resistance. Likewise, for the first three decades of the PRC, its media emphasized the CCP's role in defeating Japan while marginalizing (if not denying) the role of the KMT and its major allies (foremost, the United States). The same can be said about the Soviet Union until the 1980s: it mostly failed to single out the contribution of the United States and its allies to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.

For perpetrators (and accomplices), the media are expected to justify the past, insist on innocence, resist repentance, and enforce silence or, at least, create ambiguities, as Foucault so astutely observed.⁶⁶ This was the prevalent media trend in Austria, Italy, Japan, and to a (much) lesser extent, Germany, in the first decades after WWII (Golsan, Kansteiner, and Fogu, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu; Lind; He; Hasegawa and Togo).

Yet there is another side to the story: media can also generate counterimages and countermemories by shaking up amnesia, breaking old taboos, shattering long-held myths, and thus creating and cementing new memories, especially in democracies (Lebow, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 34–35). In France, coming to terms with the Vichy past was in small part due to Marcel Ophüls' *Le chagrin et la pitié* (*The Sorrow and the Pity*), released in 1969 in the spirit of the 1968 revolt (Golsan, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 86–89). In West Germany, the miniseries *Holocaust*, broadcast in West Germany in 1979, “accelerated the development of new collective memories like no other event before or after” (Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 124–26). The same miniseries was also most responsible for jolting Austria out of its long and comfortable amnesia under the myth of “Nazi's victim” and propelling it to acknowledge its coresponsibility for many crimes perpetrated by the Nazis (Uhl, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 60–61).

Education is key to reproducing and thus shaping the collective memory of the next generation. Since the modern nation-state banks on “national” education as part of the nation/state-building process, education has been a critical battleground for ideas: whoever owns education owns the future. Not surprisingly, both sides (left and right, conventionally defined) inevitably struggle for power over the future

⁶⁶ Foucault, cited by Golsan, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 82–84.

in the political battles over history textbooks, for those textbooks are about much more than history. They are about a view of history for the future: they are both history with politics and politics with history (Rozman, Mitani, Kim, in Hasegawa and Togo; Lind; He).

While one can argue that media are mostly about the present whereas education is about the future, there cannot be any meaningful separation of the past, present, and future, as George Orwell reminds us. Fundamentally, both media and education are channels for agents to institutionalize particular collective memories in the marketplace of ideas (Lebow, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 8–16; He, 127–33). And in the work of institutionalizing memories, one finds at the heart of the process ideas, the struggle for power to impose a (false or real) consciousness, identity, and memory, and indoctrination through ideology, education, and media. This is why specific “poetics” (or myths) of history have been such a prominent battleground.⁶⁷ As such, this process of institutionalizing memories can be intimately tied to theories of institutional change.

Once collective memories are understood as a product of institutionalization or institutional change, we can more readily understand the stickiness of memories. In institutional changes, path dependence is powerful and pervasive: once specific historical myths become institutionalized, they tend to be long-lasting and powerful, and they shape the path of history. And once we understand collective memories as a product of institutionalization, we can also easily grasp the pervasiveness of generational dynamics in the presence of change or lack of change in collective memories, noted by many authors explicitly and implicitly (Fugu and Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fugu; Lind; He). Generational changes, epitomized by the “revolution” of 1968 that swept across much of the Western Europe,⁶⁸ usually bring about some change of ideas and political power and thus of collective memories.

VI. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

All the works examined here by political scientists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists have deployed some variants of comparative case study approaches. Since the time of Eckstein and Lijphart, important progress had been made on the methodology of comparative case studies.⁶⁹ Students of reconciliation, especially Lind and He, have paid

⁶⁷ Müller 2002; Fugu and Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fugu.

⁶⁸ For a survey of 1968, see Klimke and Scharloth 2008.

⁶⁹ For a good review of this literature, see Mahoney 2010.

much attention to important methodological issues for doing historical comparative studies. Nevertheless, some methodological issues associated with comparative case studies of reconciliation have gone underappreciated. And these issues pose thorny challenges for our attempts to understand reconciliation and, by implication, for our attempts to draw policy prescriptions.

TIME HORIZON, SYSTEMIC EFFECTS, AND CAUSAL QUAGMIRE?

Reconciliation (or the lack of it) operates within or between human societies, which are complex systems. Within a system, any behavior can generate four dichotomies of overlapping impact: events versus nonevents, direct versus indirect, intended versus unintended, and immediate versus delayed.⁷⁰ Within a system, cause and effect are often not so easily and meaningfully separated, since a cause often changes the environment and the changed environment then shapes further changes. Reconciliation is also a long process. Time horizon is thus a critical dimension for understanding reconciliation.⁷¹ Putting systemic effects and time horizon together, we end up with a very complex picture that makes it very difficult to draw a causal link between a behavior and an outcome and even more difficult to attribute an outcome to a particular behavior.

For instance, focusing on intrastate reconciliation in Sierra Leone and Rwanda, Govier questioned the tactics within the reconciliation processes in the two countries because there was no *full trust* between the two opposing groups.⁷² But this may be too simplistic.

To begin with, Govier identifies trust building as a tool for reconciliation, and she takes trust as a yardstick for measuring the depth of reconciliation.⁷³ This notion is only half right. True, trust, especially extensive trust, is a result of cooperation building and actual cooperation, with reconciliation being a special kind of cooperation.⁷⁴ But trust also facilitates more cooperation and thus moves the relationship toward deep reconciliation. As such, trust and reconciliation (and more broadly, cooperation) have a feedback rather than a unidirectional relationship. By emphasizing only one direction within a feedback relationship, we almost inevitably arrive at false understandings. Moreover, it is impossible to expect *full trust* among individuals in such a short period after a bloody war (in this case, Sierra Leone), not to mention that full trust

⁷⁰ For system effects, see Jervis 1997. Jervis explicated only the first two dichotomies.

⁷¹ For a general call for bringing time back in, see Pierson 2004.

⁷² Govier 2006.

⁷³ Govier 2006, 203–4. See also Govier and Verwoerd 2002.

⁷⁴ Tang 2010, chap. 5; see also Kydd 2005.

is difficult even without a recent conflict. As such, one cannot conclude that policies pursued by Sierra Leone were necessarily wrongheaded (although they may have been) simply because there was not complete trust. There can be many other causes for this outcome: wrong policies all along, right policies but not enough time, or a mix of both wrong policies and right policies. Govier's insistence that a policy should be rejected because it could not produce full trust within a short period of time is too simplistic—throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Let us turn to specific measures of reconciliation such as apologies. Lind finds that Japanese apologies do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes toward reconciliation but often result in domestic backlash in Japan, despite the fact that none of the Japanese apologies amount to a categorical apology according to the standard of Govier and Smith.⁷⁵ Her finding echoes Nobles's earlier finding that apologies in intrastate situations do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes toward reconciliation, although they do generate debates on national history and reconciliation.⁷⁶ Yet, just because even half-baked apologies generate (perhaps unintended) domestic backlashes, it does not mean that genuine apologies would have done much worse and that half-baked apologies are therefore the better way to go, as Lind seems to imply.⁷⁷

To begin with, a (close to) genuine apology early on, though not embraced by one's domestic audience, may receive a positive response from one's former victim and thus set the stage for more robust reconciliation in the long run. West Germany's gestures toward Poland in the 1970s—symbolized by Willy Brandt's famous kneeling down—may be such a case: although they did not lead to complete reconciliation between the two nations in the short run, they may have paved the way for more robust reconciliation later (especially after the cold war). In contrast, a nonapology or a "defensive/excusing" one early on, although often met with approval by one's domestic audience, may nonetheless hinder reconciliation in the long run.

Moreover, as Mike Mochizuki points out,⁷⁸ the reason why even half-baked apologies generate domestic backlash in Japan whereas even genuine apologies do not cause so much backlash in Germany might have been that a left-central political coalition has never been in power

⁷⁵ Govier 2006; Smit 2008.

⁷⁶ Nobles 2008, chap. 4.

⁷⁷ Govier 2006, 79–84, has ably defended the other three common rejections of apologies: overload (that is, "Too many past wrongs and there is no end of apologies"), presentism (that is, "We cannot judge the past with today's moral standards"), and cynicism (that is, "Apologies are just empty gestures; we should just do away with them"). She found that all three rejections are based on false grounds.

⁷⁸ Mochizuki, in Glaser et al. 2009, 355–56.

long enough in Japan whereas such a coalition (Social Democrats led by Willy Brandt) was in power in Germany for a sustained period of time (1960–82) and the trend was so entrenched that even a conservative (like Helmut Kohl) could not reverse it. *Not only is timing important, but so, too, is the amount of time.*

Going one step further, a more forthright apology may facilitate more thorough repentance among the populace and a more thorough educational reform. This may in turn lead to more forthright apologies that will finally get the victims to forgive, and thus the former perpetrator and the victim can forge a closer relationship that will support those voices seeking deeper reconciliation in both countries. Thus, the presence of persistent domestic backlash after even nongenuine apologies may be the result of a lack of proper media campaigns and educational reform in the past. If a country has initiated a sweeping media campaign and educational reform to change the mindset of its populace, then the domestic backlash will be much milder, even if not completely absent. Again, it is not always so straightforward to identify a causal direction between events when one looks at them in a longer time horizon.

When approached from these perspectives, it may be the case that younger Japanese—precisely because there has never been a thorough educational reform in Japan—have not been receptive to a more thorough apology and a more robust reconciliation with Japan's wartime victims (Lind, esp. 32–39, 47–54). By contrast, precisely because there had been a sustained educational reform in postwar Germany in the 1960s (Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu; He, chap. 2), younger Germans in the 1970s were more receptive to a more thorough apology and a more robust reconciliation with Germany's former victims. Again, the crux of the problem was not that there were backlashes when apologies were made. Rather, the crux is why that is so and how to overcome political resistance to apologizing and shape a more favorable domestic climate for reconciliation. On this front, the works of both Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu and He offer many important insights into questions that Lind leaves behind.

The problem of time horizon, however, becomes even more salient for gauging the impact of education on reconciliation. As noted above, education is aimed at the next generation, and this explains why generational changes often bring ideational changes. As such, one can measure the impact of (national) education only after ten years, at a minimum. This in turn means that any discussion of reconciliation after the first ten years of conflict must take education into consideration. Two questions are essential. First, was there an educational reform that

explicitly repudiated the past within the perpetrators' educational system or was there merely a whitewash of the crime? Second, how sustained had the reform been (that is, had it gone backward or forward)? Any attempt to extract lessons with a shorter time frame will lead to errors and misleading policy prescriptions. On this front, the project of coauthoring history textbooks in Northeast Asia as mentioned by Mitani and Kim (both in Hasagawa and Togo) may provide a splendid opportunity for testing some of the hypotheses regarding the impact of education on reconciliation.⁷⁹

PATH DEPENDENCE IN RECONCILIATION: CRITICAL PERIODS AND TURNING POINTS

Path dependence is another way of saying that history is often sticky. For long-run processes such as reconciliation in complex (social) systems, path dependence is to be expected. This again poses some interesting methodological problems.⁸⁰

Path dependence implies the existence of some critical periods and events in solidifying a particular path. For the more specific question of reconciliation, power and the institutionalization of memory are a key source of path dependence: existing memories and institutions inevitably shape things later.⁸¹ For example, if both perpetrators and victims had institutionalized memories that diverged from the other's and these hegemonic memories were then propagated through education and public media, one would expect that these memories would come to hinder the reconciliation process later (He). Much of the incomplete/less robust reconciliation thereafter can be understood as an outcome of path dependence in the institutionalization of memory.

Most authors under review here seem to agree that the period immediately after the conflict, especially the period of initial occupation of the loser's country by the victors, is a critical period for determining the path of reconciliation thereafter. How major actors and events played out in this period is important in determining the fate of reconciliation. Obviously, for our post-WWII world, the formative years of the cold war constituted the critical period.

In perpetrator countries where the righteous victors imposed a more thorough purging of the perpetrators' old guard, reconciliation between these perpetrators and their former victims went a bit more smoothly.

⁷⁹ The cases of South Africa, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone are also fertile ground. For an earlier discussion that generally neglects the temporal dimension, see Mendeloff 2004.

⁸⁰ Pierson 2004; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007.

⁸¹ Pierson 2004; Tang 2011.

Despite the fact that West Germany was far from entirely coming to terms with its dark past, it was more effectively compelled by the occupying allies to face its past and come to terms with France, the Jewish people, and Israel. Educational reform in Germany was not only more thorough but also firmly entrenched. This period thus laid a firmer foundation for a more robust reconciliation between Germany and its former victims.⁸² In contrast, in perpetrator countries where the victors did not impose a relatively thorough purging of the old guard, reconciliation between the perpetrators and their former victims was a much bumpier process. As the cold war set in, the United States and its allies were more eager to enlist Austria and Italy in the West's camp than to make them repent for their Nazi past. When Austrian rightists were openly for "creating a positive image of the soldier of the Second World War" rather than repenting, this goal was actively encouraged by the United States (Lebow, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 25, 30–31, 51; see also Uhl, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu). Undoubtedly, this episode delayed Austria's coming to terms with its past. Similarly, Japan's reconciliation with China and Korea was perhaps permanently cut short by MacArthur's lighter purging of the old guard, as the cold war gathered its storm. With the outcome of the Chinese Civil War (1945–49) becoming evident and then the onset of the cold war (1946–49) in which China joined the socialist camp, the United States was increasingly trying to turn Japan into a frontline ally in East Asia rather than trying to pressure Japan to make a sharp break from its past.⁸³ Quite evidently, the coming of the cold war made fundamental political change in Japan unwelcome and reconciliation with China unnecessary. Equally important, educational reform in Japan was essentially reversed. It is no wonder, then, that the backlash against even nongenuine apologies has been widespread and loud in Japan.

Path dependence also implies that it usually takes some kind of turning point to break out of a particular path. More often than not, these turning points take the form of crises. After all, "crisis periods prompt awareness of the crucial political importance of the past for the present. As a rule, crises are times during which the living do battle for the hearts, minds, and souls of the dead,"⁸⁴ and "the dead also do battle for the hearts, minds, and souls of the living, as the latter often resort during times of crises to a kind of mythical re-enactment of the past."⁸⁵

⁸² Moeller 2001; Kansteiner, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 117; Lind, 105–14; He, chap. 2.

⁸³ Dower 2000, 476–78; Rose 2005, 34–39; Gozman, Straub, in Hasegawa and Togo; Lind, 29–39; and He, 291–98.

⁸⁴ John Keane 1988, 204, quoted in Müller 2002, 3.

⁸⁵ Müller 2002, 3–4.

So far, many studies of reconciliation have been chronicles or broader historical surveys. This is a necessary first step. In light of the prevalence and profoundness of path dependence, however, it may be fruitful to look at turning points for a deeper understanding of reconciliation.⁸⁶ Indeed, studies under review here have already singled out certain points. In Austria, the 1986 debate on Kurt Waldheim and the rise to power of ultra-rightist parties led by Jorg Haider in 2000 (and the subsequent strong pan-European reaction) were turning points in pushing Austria toward a more forthright effort to come to terms with its past. In France, the pardon of Paul Touvier (a former high-ranking Vichy official) by Pompidou in 1971 and Mitterrand's revelation of his own Vichy past in 1994 were turning points in France's coming to terms with its past (Golsan, in Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 80–84). In Germany, Theodor Heuss's 1952 speech at Bergen-Belsen, Brandt's famous kneeling down in Warsaw, and the saga of Bitburg served similar purposes. In contrast, a lack of such turning points most likely indicates a lack of progress in reconciliation (for example, between Japan and its Asian victims). Finally, if the cold war had been such a powerful lid on states' coming to terms with their past, we can reasonably suspect that the end of the cold war might have been a pivotal turning point in propelling states into a more forthright confrontation with their past, as most authors reviewed here seem to concur.

It is also important to note that certain media events can generate immense public attention and thus jolt states out of their amnesia. The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (1961) and the television series *Holocaust* (1979) caused a stir in the Austrian and German national psyche. In France, Marcel Ayme's novel *Uranus* (1948); Marcel Ophuls' *Le chagrin and la pitié* (*The Sorrow and the Pity*) (1971), Claude Lanzmann's documentary *Shoah* (1985), and Henry Russo's *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past* (1994) were all instrumental in debunking the myth of national resistance and exposing average Frenchmen's compliance and conspiracy with Nazis in murdering Jews. In the case of Japan-China reconciliation, Iris Chang's *Rape of Nanjing* (1993), the debate on history textbooks in Japan in 2001, and Lu Chuan's recent film *Nanking! Nanking!* (2008) may have served similar purposes.⁸⁷ By "re-

⁸⁶ For attempts that adopt this kind of approach (that is, looking at turning points) toward other issues, see Herrmann and Lebow 2004.

⁸⁷ It is in this spirit that Satoh 2009 wondered (and hoped) whether former Japanese prime minister Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine might become a Bitburg as a possible turning point in Japan's struggle to come to terms with its past. See also Tanaka, in Hasegawa and Togo. Another possible important event was the "War Responsibility Project," published by Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan's largest daily newspaper by circulation, with a general conservative tone) in 2005; Auer 2006.

enacting" the dark past,⁸⁸ media outputs that provoke repentance and critical thinking facilitate a robust reconciliation.

CONCLUSION

Due to space limitations, I shall merely highlight two points related to the theoretical implications of reconciliation. Foremost, quite evidently, successful reconciliation constitutes the firmest evidence possible for constructivism's claim that anarchy can indeed be (re-)made.⁸⁹ At the same time, it is clear that realist measures such as reassurance are indispensable for jump-starting reconciliation. Students of reconciliation have taken the lead in empirically synthesizing constructivism and realism; future work should build on this synthesis. Second, inspired by the European experience, constructivism tends to focus on common identity.⁹⁰ Yet a common theme drawn from the works reviewed here has been that reshaping an image of one's former foe into an image of a nonfoe may be far more critical for building a lasting foundation for cooperation than a common identity. Intuitively, unless two former foes can reimagine a new and benign image for each other, no robust common identity (plus some common memories), which is desirable and powerful in the long run, is possible.

There is no doubt that many bilateral intergroup relationships today need genuine reconciliation. Systematic works on reconciliation can thus generate important policy prescriptions for building peace in the real world. The works examined here have already generated some important policy implications for engineering successful reconciliation. First, there needs to be a (re-)writing of history together in order to minimize national myths (Mitani, in Hasegawa and Togo; He 35–40), even if "a historical agreement [across the board] across countries is both illusory and undesirable."⁹¹ Second, there must be some serious restitution measures (including apologies, no matter how great the domestic backlash they may generate). More concretely, these volumes point to some fairly explicit roles and rules for politicians, elite, opinion makers, and the general public in forging reconciliation. These important policy implications notwithstanding, I shall end on a cautionary note. We have just begun to understand reconciliation. In light of the

⁸⁸ Here, I am borrowing from Esquith's (2003) title, "Re-enacting Mass Violence."

⁸⁹ Wendt 1992.

⁹⁰ Wendt 1999; Checkel 2000. Incidentally, some psychologists also emphasize common identity (for example, Dovidio et al. and Riet et al., in Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher).

⁹¹ Mochizuki, in Glaser et al. 2009, 357.

enormous complexity and challenges posed by reconciliation, much more needs to be done before we can confidently prescribe more extensive and concrete measures for reconciliation.⁹² So far, we have only a dim sense about many thorny questions. As such, I would caution against the rush to draw conclusions about the policy implications of these findings.

Reconciliation is connected to some of the deepest emotions and the most difficult politics in human society. I have attempted to link the study of reconciliation with a very diverse literature, out of a conviction that only an interdisciplinary approach can move us toward a more adequate understanding of reconciliation, whether interstate or intrastate. Jurists, philosophers, psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists need to work with each other closely on this challenging topic.

REFERENCES

- Adler, Emmanuel. [1991] 2005. "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress." Reprinted in Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*. London: Routledge: 65–88.
- Adler, Emmanuel, and Michael Barnett. 1998. "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities." In Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 29–65.
- Adorno, Theodor W. 1986. "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?" In Geoffrey Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 114–29.
- Appleby, R. Scott. 2002. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Auer, James E., ed. 2006. *From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible?* Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun.
- Bargal, David, and Emmanuel Sivan. 2004. "Leadership and Reconciliation." In Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 125–47.
- Barkan, Elazar, and Alexander Karn, eds. 2006. *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaakov, ed. 2004. *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Gemma H. Bennink. 2004. "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process." In Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 11–38.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1978. *Stable Peace*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bunge, Mario. 1997. "Explanation and Mechanisms." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 27, no. 4: 410–65.

⁹² For an exchange on specific policy prescriptions generated by Lind's study, see Glaser et al. 2009.

- Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. "The Study of Critical Junc-tures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." *World Politics* 59, no. 3 (April): 341–69.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001. "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change." *International Organization* 55, no. 3: 553–88.
- Crawford, Neta C. 2000. "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emo-tion and Emotional Relationships." *International Security* 24, no. 4: 116–56.
- Cummings, Bruce. 1997. *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*. New York: Nor-ton.
- Dower, John W. 2000. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of WWII*. New York: Norton.
- Esquith, Stephen L. 2003. "Re-enacting Mass Violence." *Polity* 35, no. 4: 513–34.
- Eykholt, Mark. 2000. "Aggression, Victimization, and Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre." In Joshua A. Fogel, ed., *The Nanjing Massacre in His-tory and Historiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 11–69.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of In-ternational Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3: 577–92.
- Frantz, Cynthia M., and Courtney Bennigson. 2004. "Better Late than Early: The Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 41, no. 2: 201–7.
- Fujitani, Takashi, ed. 2001. *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- Gildea, Robert. 2002. "Myth, Memory and Policy in France since 1945." In Jan-Werner Müller ed., *Power and Memory in Post-War Europe*. 59–75.
- Glaser, Charles L., Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jennifer Lind. 2009. "Roundtable Discussion of Jennifer's Lind Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 4: 337–68.
- Govier, Trudy. 2006. *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace*. Amherst, N. Y.: Humanity Books.
- Govier, Trudy, and Wilhelm Verwoerd. 2002. "Trust and the Problem of National Reconciliation." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 32, no. 2: 178–205.
- Gries, Peter Hay. 2005. "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan." *China Quarterly* 184 (December): 831–50.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1988a. "A Kind of Settlement of Damages (Apologetic Ten-dencies)." *New German Critique* 44 (Special Issue on the Historians): 25–39.
- . 1988b. "Concerning the Public Use of History." *New German Critique* 44 (Special Issue on the Historians): 40–50.
- Herrmann, Richard, and Richard Ned Lebow, eds. 2004. *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causations, and the Study of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of Cali-fornia Press.
- Iyer, Aarti, and Colin Wayne Leach. 2008. "Emotions in Inter-group Relations." *European Review of Social Psychology* 19, no. 1: 86–125.
- Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- . 2004. "The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis (an interview with Thierry Balzacq)." *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4: 559–82.
- Kacowicz, Arie M. 1998. *Zone of Peace in the Third World*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kacowicz, Arie M., Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ole Elgstrom, and Magnus Jerneck, eds. 2000. *Stable Peace among Nations*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Kelman, Herbert C. 2005. "Building Trust among Enemies: The Central Challenge in International Conflict Resolution." *International Journal of Intercultural Studies* 29, no. 6: 639–50.
- Klein, Kerwin L. 2000. "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse." *Representations* 69 (Winter): 127–50.
- Klimke, Martin, and Joachim Scharloth, eds. 2008. *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kristof, Nicholas D. 1998. "The Problem of Memory." *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 6 (November–December): 37–49.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2005. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Larson, Deborah W., and Alexei Shevchenko. 2010. "Status Seekers: Russian and Chinese Response to U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 34, no. 4: 63–95.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. *Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, Chae-Jin. 1973. "The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty." *Pacific Affairs* 52, no. 3: 420–45.
- LeVine, Robert A., and Donald T. Campbell. 1972. *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behaviors*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Lind, Jennifer. 2010. "Regime Type and National Remembrance." Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 17–20.
- Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mackie, Diane, and Eliot R. Smith, eds. 2002. *From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups*. New York and Hove: Psychology Press.
- Mahoney, James. 2010. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (January): 120–47.
- Mendeloff, David. 2004. "Truth-seeking, Truth-telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?" *International Studies Review* 6, no. 3: 355–80.
- Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics." *International Organization* 59, no. 1: 77–106.
- Moeller, Robert. 2001. *War Stories: The Search for Usable History in Federal Republic of Germany*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Müeller, Jan-Werner, ed. 2002. *Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2008. *The Politics of Official Apologies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Nora, Pierre. 1989. *Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire. Representations*, no. 26 (special issue on collective memory): 7–24.
- Norval, Aletta J. 1999. "Review: Truth and Reconciliation: The Birth of the Present and the Reworking of History." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 25, no. 3: 499–519.
- Olick, Jeffrey K. 1999. "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures." *Sociological Theory* 17, no. 3: 333–48.
- Oliner, Samuel P., aided by Piotr Olaf Zylicz. 2008. *Altruism, Intergroup Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation*. St. Paul, Minn.: Paragon House.
- Phillips, Ann L. 2001. "The Politics of Reconciliation Revisited: Germany and East-Central Europe." *World Affairs* 163, no. 4: 171–91.
- Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 2: 427–60.
- Ripsman, Norrin M. 2005. "Two Stages of Transition from a Region of War to a Region of Peace: Realist Transition and Liberal Endurance." *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 4: 669–93.
- Rose, Caroline. 2005. *Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?* London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Samuels, Richard. 2005. *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Satoh, Haruko. 2008. "Japan: Re-engaging with China Meaningfully?" In Shiping Tang, Mingjiang Li, and Amitav Acharya, eds., *Living with China: Regional States and China*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 107–28.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59, no. 1: 1–38.
- Segev, Tom. 2000. *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Smith, Nick. 2008. *I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sneider, Daniel. 2008. "Divided Memories and Reconciliation: A Progress Report." At http://iis-db.stanford.edu/res/2260/Divided-Memory_In-house_2008.pdf, accessed February 2009.
- Solingen, Etel. 1998. *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1982. "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Annual Review of Psychology* 33: 1–39.
- Tang, Shiping. 2008. "Fear and International Politics: Two Positions." *International Studies Review* 10, no. 3: 451–71.
- . 2009. "Taking Stock of Neoclassical Realism." *International Studies Review* 11, no. 4: 799–803.
- . 2010. *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2011a. *A General Theory of Institutional Change*. London: Routledge.
- . 2011b. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3: 511–36.

- Tombs, David, and Joseph Liechty, eds. 2006. *Explorations in Reconciliation: New Directions in Theology*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate.
- Volf, Miroslav. 1996. *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation*. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It." *International Organization* 46, no. 2: 391–425.
- Yoneyama, L. 1999. *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Yoshida, Takashi. 2000. "A Battle over History: The Nanjing Massacre in Japan." In Joshua A. Fogel, ed., *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 70–132.