


Classics of International Relations

Essays in Criticism and Appreciation



Edited by

Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest and Peter Wilson



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13 The virtue of uncertain advice: Robert Jervis' *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*

Shiping Tang¹

In *Perception and Misperception in International Politics (P&M)*,² displaying 'prodigious learning' in his early to middle thirties,³ Robert Jervis was able to weave (social) psychology, the history of science and technology (e.g. pp. 165–72, 195–201) and, of course, diplomatic and international histories, into a marvel.

P&M solidified the status of political/social psychology of international politics as a legitimate field of inquiry in International Relations (IR).⁴ Yet, *P&M* is much more than an importation of psychology into IR. It touches upon a host of key IR issues, puzzles and concepts that remain essential for understanding IR. *P&M* offers extensive, profound and enlightening, yet often uncertain (in the positive sense of the word), insights into some of the most central problems in IR.

Jervis's classic is not just dry stuff for IR scholars only. Like his other works, *P&M* speaks loudly (although not always unambiguously) to policy-makers. Each chapter in *P&M* contains a wealth of information that alerts policy-makers to the profound ambiguities, difficult trade-offs and psychological obstacles in making strategic decisions: indeed, most of the chapters have a section entitled 'implications for decision-making' or 'suggestions'. It is not an overstatement that Jervis's works offer far more (albeit demanding) advice than most of the policy-oriented books that purport to offer clear-cut solutions to pressing problems.⁵ Decision-makers do themselves (and all of us) a disservice by ignoring his witty, subtle, but never certain, teaching. It is a safe bet that, after reading Jervis, all of us (including decision-makers) will probably be left with a slightly deflated (or at least, a less inflated) ego, because one of Jervis's cardinal messages is that our perceptions and judgements are marred by many biases and errors that are hard to avoid.⁶

The rest of this short appraisal of *P&M* consists of the following. Section I introduces the volume's structure. Section II singles out the volume's major contributions. Section III offers a critique of the volume. I conclude with some observations on the future of a psychological approach to IR and political science in general as well as on the future of social psychology itself.

Before I move on to the specifics, however, I would like to emphasize two key messages that Jervis has been trying to convey to IR (and the broader social sciences) that unfortunately have long been underappreciated in the post-Waltzian rush towards theoretical parsimony and the quest for firm answers. The first message is an insistence on the need for a multi-levelled and systemic *rather than structural* approach towards social sciences (especially pp. 18–31, emphasis added).⁷ At the onset of *P&M* (p. 6), Jervis explicitly states that his approach will be 'eclectic' ('too eclectic for some tastes', in his own words), and this ability to eclectically draw from a wide range of literature,

in addition to IR and political sciences, has been a hallmark of Jervis's long and distinguished career. This eclectic approach, already apparent in his *Logic of Images*,⁸ anticipates his most interesting work, *System Effects*.⁹ In my view, scholars who draw from a wide literature and consider more factors at different levels will always be more sophisticated than scholars who tend to reason simplistically under the cover of seeking parsimony.

The second message is Jervis's appreciation of the complexity of social systems and, thus, his refusal to give clear-cut answers to many questions: for him, it is simply self-evident that there cannot be firm and definitive answers to many questions, because social life is simply too complex. This message, undoubtedly not very popular, was most explicitly articulated in *System Effects*,¹⁰ although both *Logic of Images* and *P&M* already underscore the message, however implicitly.

Finally, a specific caveat regarding *P&M* is in order. Jervis has always taken signalling and reading signals (i.e. perception and misperception) to be two sides of the same coin.¹¹ Indeed, his original plan was to study both signalling and perception, and he decided to work on the two sides separately only after the task had turned out to be too large. For Jervis, therefore, *Logic of Images* and *P&M* are part of the same (ongoing) project, and we do ourselves a service by reading the two texts together, despite the fact that *P&M* has received far greater attention than *Logic of Images*.

The structure and scope of *Perception and Misperception*

On the first page of *P&M* (p. 3), Jervis posed the central questions for his book:

What are the causes and consequences of misperception? What kinds of perceptual errors commonly occur in decision-making? How are beliefs about politics and images of other actors formed and altered? How do decision-makers draw inferences from information, especially information that could be seen as contradicting their own views?

Affirming that decision-makers' perceptions do matter for understanding important issues in international politics, Jervis then goes on to show that 'many important differences in policy preferences are traceable to differences in decision-makers' perceptions of their environment and that there are important differences between reality and shared or common perceptions' (pp. 14–15). Methodologically, Jervis relied on a two-step model: first establishing decision-makers' perceptions as the immediate or proxy indicators for their decisions and then relating those perceptions to reality, or at least to the information available to decision-makers. Of course, this was done on the understanding that psychological factors are not the only factors that influence decision-makers' perceptions: other factors such as international and domestic politics are legion, but they have to be put to one side in order to concentrate on the already huge task in hand (pp. 28–31).

After the short introductory chapter, *P&M* is divided into four major parts. Part I, 'The Setting', comprises three chapters. Chapter 1 deals with perception as part of the 'level of analysis' problem (i.e. viewing IR from the individual, state, and systemic levels). Chapter 2 introduces the question of how the behaviour of others is perceived, with a special focus on intentions that paves the way for the discussion in Chapter 3. Chapter 3, undoubtedly the most cited part of the whole book, explores the contrast

between the deterrence model and the spiral model, which centres on the intentions of the adversary. This chapter anticipates another of Jervis's seminal articles, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'.¹² This chapter also identifies reassurance as a process that builds cooperation and trust between states (see below).

Part II, 'Processes of Perception', comprises four chapters. Chapter 4 introduces 'cognitive consistency' as a major source of misperceptions, emphasizing the impact of (relatively) deeply held preconceptions on our perceptions. Chapter 5 deals with the impact of our immediate concerns on our processing of incoming information, regardless of whether there is communication between the objects we wish to learn about and ourselves. Building on the discussion in previous chapters, Chapter 6 explores a key topic: 'how decision-makers learn from history'. The chapter also contains a tantalizing appendix on the impact of domestic politics and training on perception and judgement, which Jervis unfortunately did not develop further in the book. Chapter 7 discusses the possibility and the means of attitude change, in light of the fact that we tend to maintain, if not strengthen, our existing perceptions and judgements even in possession of discrepant information.

Part III, 'Common Misperceptions', focuses on several important misperceptions and their sources. This part again has four chapters. Chapter 8 addresses the agency of others as centralized or coherent: we often see the behaviour of others as more centralized, planned, coordinated and therefore often more wicked and threatening than they actually are. Chapter 9 underscores our tendency to overestimate our importance as causes of others' *desired* behaviours or as target of their *undesired* behaviours. Chapter 10 explores the impact of desires and fears on perception. Finally, Chapter 11 singles out cognitive dissonance as a major source of cognitive distortion after we have committed to a particular policy or behaviour, especially when things have not turned out as expected or desired.¹³

Part IV is a short concluding chapter that gives some advice on how to minimize misperceptions, recognizing that total avoidance is impossible.

The lasting impact of *Perception and Misperception*

To some extent, *P&M* is unique among classics of IR: unlike many others, *P&M* does not offer a grand theory or a sweeping narrative about international politics. Instead, *P&M* elaborates and touches upon a host of key IR issues, puzzles and concepts. At the very least, these include uncertainty, intentions versus interests and resolve (pp. 48–54), the security dilemma/spiral model, deterrence, trust and trustworthiness (p. 44), reassurance attempts and programmes (p. 82), signalling, reading signals (i.e. perceptions and misperceptions), the commitment problem (pp. 44–45), objective and subjective incompatibility of interest (pp. 75–76), concern for reputation of resolve (pp. 102–7), the domino effect as positive feedback (pp. 58–62, 100–107),¹⁴ sunk costs and sticking with a bad policy (Chapters 4 and 11). It even anticipates 'framing' and 'loss aversion' (pp. 51–52, 393–99) as captured by prospect theory.¹⁵

Owing to its broad canvas and nuanced arguments, *P&M* is not an easy target for critics. Rather, *P&M* opened up a vast new territory for exploration and inspired an ever-growing literature, directly and indirectly: *P&M* is an ideal launching pad for understanding the psychological dimensions in international politics. Indeed, many dissertations and monographs have been written to tease out, criticize, refine and develop some of the themes that emerged from *P&M*.¹⁶ Below, I focus on those

fundamental concepts and notions in *P&M* that have been the most influential and received the most attention.

The security dilemma, the spiral model and intentions

Jervis's discussion of the spiral model and the security dilemma in Chapter 3 of *P&M* and 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma' have turned the security dilemma and the spiral model into some of IR's key concepts.¹⁷ They also inspired an extensive literature on the security dilemma as a possible cause of ethnic conflict,¹⁸ although this literature has been saddled by much conceptual confusion that was not cleared up until very recently.¹⁹

Building upon Osgood's 'gradual reciprocation in tension-reduction' (GRIT),²⁰ Chapter 3 of *P&M* also laid part of the foundation for understanding reassurance as a cooperation and trust-building process and how mistrust can form between two benign states and prevent them from achieving cooperation.²¹ This chapter also provides a key platform for bringing arms control into reassurance and cooperation-building.²²

Chapter 3 makes it clear that gauging the intentions of others is a key task for states. This key emphasis laid part of the theoretical foundation for the school of defensive realism.²³ Jervis also noted that intentions interact with interest and resolve (pp. 48–49). His discussion, thus, points to the need for a more fine-grained differentiation of four internal dimensions (capabilities, interests, intentions and resolve) and the external environment when it comes to understanding an actor's behaviour (or non-behaviour), which was taken up recently.²⁴ Relatedly, Jervis also developed a typology of states based on their willingness to take risks (pp. 48–54). Even more strikingly, Jervis's insistence that states can change their types anticipates the possibility of 'identity changes', long before constructivism became fashionable, as he wittily noted later.²⁵

Cognition, emotion and learning in war and peace

A central theme from *P&M* has been that nothing can be more off the mark than assuming decision-makers to be capable of digesting and synthesizing vast amounts of information in a cool-headed fashion, especially in times of crisis. This theme too has inspired a growing literature, and it tends to be more empirical in orientation. With in-depth investigations of historical cases, these works provided more robust evidence that faulty perceptions and judgements often do lead to misguided decisions, resulting in the escalation of international crises and unfulfilled cooperation.

Building on Jervis's discussion about cognitive closure and dissonance, Lebow showed that many international crises originated in or escalated to war owing, in no small part, to decision-makers' irrational cognitive closure and urge to reduce cognitive dissonance under the influence of stresses and emotions.²⁶ Larson inquired into the origins of containment policy as a shifting of beliefs and attitudes by examining the belief systems and schemas of key US decision-makers in the early days of the Cold War.²⁷ Bringing political consideration firmly into the picture, Farnham examined Franklin Roosevelt's reading into and coping with the looming threat posed by Hitler's Germany both before and after the Munich Crisis.²⁸

Taking Jervis's discussion about learning from history and the psychological literature on heuristics as a starting point,²⁹ Khong explored how historical events shaped analogies (as a form of heuristics) which in turn shaped perception of interests and

choices of strategies by key US decision-makers in the months leading up to the fateful escalation in Vietnam in the summer of 1965.³⁰ Reiter, critically building upon Jervis and Khong, explores how small states' choice of allies is based on learning from their past experiences with both quantitative and qualitative methods.³¹

Examining costly US interventions in the Third World and their aftermaths, Hopf identified the misplaced belief in domino effects by US decision-makers as a key factor that had propelled the USA into those interventions.³² Mercer's *Reputation in International Relations* focuses on reputation as images of others based on their past behaviour. His central argument is that much of decision-makers' concern for their reputation for resolve during conflict, or their belief in the 'domino theory', may be unfounded.³³

Although not directly influenced by, but certainly encouraged by *P&M*, McDermott deployed prospect theory to examine the conditions under which US decision-makers are more or less willing to take risks during foreign policy crises.³⁴ More recently, Taliaferro has applied prospect theory to understand why leaders persisted with dead-end policies despite mounting evidence that their policies were doomed.³⁵

Things to desire in *Perception and Misperception*

Classics are classics not because they are faultless. Perhaps the most glaring omission in *P&M* is an all too evident lack of attention to emotion, as Jervis himself recognized and readily admitted later.³⁶ Although *P&M* mentions ego and decision-makers' political motivation from time to time (e.g. pp. 382n2, 400n37, Chapter 10), its core approach is cold cognitive, conforming to the mood of psychology of its time: its only focused discussion on emotion being in Chapter 10 concerning desires and fear. Indeed, Jervis himself, on the opening page, singled out that 'more attention is paid to emotional than to cognitive actors' as a major fault of the psychology literature of the era, as if emotions and perceptions can be separated.³⁷

Yet, it is apparent from even Jervis's own discussion in *P&M* that much of what he had to say cannot operate without emotions (pp. 68–94, Chapters 4, 5, 9 and 11). Without egocentrism and ethnocentrism (i.e. group feelings), there can be no self-interest and national interest. Without egocentrism and ethnocentrism, it is hard to understand why we tend to have little empathy for the interests, intentions and demonstrations of resolve of others, and why even genuinely aggressive states tend to put much of the blame on the other side and neglect the possibility that one's own behaviour has been a cause of undesired reactions of others. Without decision-makers' egos and the motivated biases derived from them, it is hard to explain why they tend to resist trade-offs when facing difficult choices and stick with doomed policies while dismissing disconfirming information along the way: these biases are motivated, both emotionally and materially (cf. Chapters 4 and 11).³⁸

Likewise, without fear, it is hard to understand the salience of the enemy image and, in turn, the commitment problem (e.g. pp. 310–11).³⁹ Without fear, it is hard to understand the differential perceptions of malignant and benign intentions. Without fear and ego, it is hard to understand why we tend to overestimate our importance as the cause of desired behaviour of others and as the target of their undesired behaviour (pp. 343–55).⁴⁰ Finally, without emotions, it is hard to understand post-decisional emotional conflict and stress.⁴¹ To put it bluntly, without emotions such as fear, honour and ethnocentrism, it is hard to understand international politics and the broader social world, as Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out long ago.⁴²

A second fault of *P&M* lies in its not entirely consistent use of concepts, labels and categories. Most prominently, Jervis did not neatly tie up all the loose ends on the security dilemma and the spiral model.⁴³ As such, many have extended and expanded, if not bent, the security dilemma and the spiral model to the degree of abusing the concept, resulting in much confusion which was not redressed until very recently.⁴⁴

Finally, although Jervis was extremely careful when grafting psychological literature to IR, he often uses evidence from domestic scenarios (e.g. labour negotiations and congressional hearings) to illustrate situations in IR. This is not always valid: anarchy does make a difference.⁴⁵

The future of psychology in international politics

Building on the works of George, Jervis, Janis and many others, studying the psychological dimensions of IR has become a thriving (sub-)field within IR and the field has grown alongside psychology. Yet, the field is not without its challenges. To begin with, the psychological literature has been very fragmented, as psychologists themselves have acknowledged. This means that when explaining a complex social fact, we need more than just a few psychological traits. Yet, too often, many psychology-based works on IR (and on political issues in general) tend to single out one or two psychological traits in order to explain some fairly complex social facts, often without combining them with political factors (e.g. domestic politics). Alternatively, they tend to pit different psychological traits against each other as if our brains always operate using one circuit at a time. This not only oversimplifies complex social facts but results in the fallacy of 'over-psychologizing' of which Jervis gave warning. To better understand political decisions, we need to synthesize politics and psychology more organically and rely on more than one or two psychological traits, despite the methodological obstacles.⁴⁶ In the same vein, we also have to resist the temptation to pit rational reasoning against psychological logic or to pit different psychological traits against each other.

Second, even if we want to look into how the interaction between cognition, emotion and politics shapes decision-makers' perceptions and decisions in the real world, this may prove to be a very difficult, if not impossible, task. Khong as well as Lebow and Stein came closest because they were able to interview some key decision-makers at times of crisis, but their successes may be difficult to repeat.⁴⁷ When this is the case, perhaps IR theorists should become less elite-centric and shift to focus on the interaction between cognition, emotion and politics at the popular level. On this front, the interaction of politics and collective memories in intrastate and interstate reconciliations may be a fertile ground for developing new ideas.⁴⁸

Third and related to the second, a key challenge for the psychological study of IR is to link psychological factors with big issues. On this front, constructivism's emphasis on identity and identity changes is an obvious trial field.⁴⁹ As Jervis rightly pointed out,⁵⁰ however, much of constructivism for years has been very structural, ignoring psychological factors altogether. Yet, whereas realism as a mostly materialist approach can somewhat afford to ignore the real processes of ideational change and the transformational power of ideas in human society, constructivism cannot, preaching as it does the transformational power of ideas. Structural constructivism (without psychology) is thus an oxymoron. We need to bridge the gap between macro-social (material and ideational) changes and psychological changes. On this front, Norbert Elias's magnum opus *The Civilizing Process*,⁵¹ which masterfully weaves together psychological changes and

macro-social changes (both material and ideational), should be a constant source of inspiration.

Finally, IR theorists have not been shy about borrowing from the psychological literature. However, can IR theorists contribute to social psychology, theoretically? Some have been trying to do this by formulating new theories that promise to integrate many dispersed psychological theories and to advance new hypotheses regarding our psychology that are testable in experimental settings.⁵² At the same time, we also need psychologists to draw from IR and the broader political sciences and sociology literature. So far, social psychologists have almost exclusively drawn inspirations from each other, and the dialogue between social psychology and political sciences or sociology has mostly been a one-way street. Yet, social psychology cannot expect to mature by working mostly with college sophomores. Instead, social psychologists have a great deal to gain by learning from and cooperating with political scientists and sociologists because the latter know a lot about how individuals, from key decision-makers to voters, think and act in *important* real life situations. And in this regard *P&M* has shown the way.

Notes

- 1 The author thanks Jon Mercer, Xiaoyu Pu, Jiwu Yin and, most importantly, the always enlightening and modest Bob Jervis himself, for their critical comments. All errors and omissions are the author's own.
- 2 Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Page numbers placed in parentheses in the text refer to this edition.
- 3 I simply cannot resist plagiarizing Karl Popper's words for Donald T. Campbell's classic paper, 'Evolutionary Epistemology', without citing either Popper or Campbell. For Jervis's fascinating reflections on his own intellectual career, see Robert Jervis with Thierry Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', *Review of International Studies*, 2004, vol. 30, 559–82. See also 'Theory Talks with Robert Jervis', *Theory Talk*, 12. Available at: www.theory-talks.org/2008/07/theory-talk-12.html (accessed on 24 August 2012). For a touching tribute to Jervis (plus Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Peter Katzenstein) by Rose McDermott (one of Jervis's students), see 'Great Mentors', *Perspectives on Politics*, 2010, vol. 43, 713–15.
- 4 Other important contributions came from Kenneth Boulding, Joseph De Rivera, Merton Deutsch, Alexander George, Margaret Hermann, Irving Janis, Herbert Kelman, Robert North and Charles Osgood, none of whom can be cited here owing to space limitations.
- 5 For Jervis's own take on how his thinking on policy issues and theoretical issues mutually benefit each other, see Robert Jervis with Thierry Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis'.
- 6 Jervis himself certainly would like to think that his former students 'who serve in the government or who as academics have gone in for temporary stints understand that they may be wrong, and are wiser for this' (Robert Jervis, personal communication with the author, 11 October 2011).
- 7 By 'systemic', I mean an approach that considers interaction among many factors at different levels. For a more detailed discussion about the systemic approach, see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- 8 Robert Jervis, *Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- 9 Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*; and Jervis and Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', p. 571. He reaffirmed this take in personal communication with the author (June 2006), when he was preparing a new preface for the Chinese translation of *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*.

- 10 Thus, if you come to look for definitive answers in Jervis, *Logic of Images in International Relations, Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and especially *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, you would be disappointed. Indeed, when I first discussed *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* with my fellow graduate students, they could not conceal their disbelief: 'That book has no [specific] theory!' My reply was: 'Well, *System Effects* is not about small theories, it is about a perspective for understanding the social world!' I shall refrain from summarizing what systemic effects are here, not only because there is no way that I can summarize what systemic effects are, but also because I hold *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* to be a required reading for any student of human society: There is no replacement for reading the text itself.
- 11 Robert Jervis, 'Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images', in Kristen Monroe (ed.), *Political Psychology*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002, pp. 293–312, at pp. 295–96. See also Jervis and Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', pp. 560–61.
- 12 Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 1978, vol. 30, 167–214.
- 13 Cognitive consistency (Chapter 4) and evoked sets (Chapter 5) operate before a decision or behavior. Cognitive dissonance (Chapter 11) operates after a decision or behavior, especially when the outcome turns out to be undesired. In this sense, Chapter 11 should immediately follow Chapters 4 and 5.
- 14 See also Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Chapter 4); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds), *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- 15 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', *Econometrica*, 1979, vol. 47, 263–91; and Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice', *Science*, 1981, vol. 211, 453–58.
- 16 I limit my discussion to those works that are more directly inspired by Jervis's *Logic of Images in International Relations and Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Not surprisingly, some of the works were written by Jervis's former students (e.g. Barbara Farnham, Ted Hopf, Chaim D. Kaufmann, Rose McDermott and Jonathan Mercer).
- 17 See Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', *World Politics*, 1992, vol. 44, 497–538; Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; and Shiping Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, especially Chapters 2 and 3. See also Casper Sylvest's chapter on Herz in this volume.
- 18 See, for example, Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', *Survival*, vol. 35, 27–47.
- 19 Shiping Tang, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict', *Review of International Studies*, 2011, vol. 37, 511–36.
- 20 Charles A. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962. Briefly, GRIT means one side takes some initial conciliatory steps to reduce tensions between itself and another state. If the other state responds positively, then the two states may end up in an improved relationship. In more formal terms, GRIT is based on the logic of reassurance and costly signaling.
- 21 Deborah W. Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: US-Soviet Relations during the Cold War*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997; Andrew Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; and Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism*, Chapter 5.
- 22 See, for example, Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy'; Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help', *International Security*, 1994–95, vol. 19, 50–90; and Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time*, Chapter 5.
- 23 Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics: Two Positions', *International Studies Review*, 2008, vol. 10, 451–70; and Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time*. Very briefly, defensive realism does not assume all states to be malignant. As such, a defensive realist state does not believe that offensive strategies are the only viable security strategy: cooperation is also a viable option.

- 24 Shiping Tang, 'Outline of a New Theory of Attribution in IR: Dimensions of Uncertainty and their Cognitive Challenges', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2012, vol. 5, 299–338.
- 25 Jervis with Thierry Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', pp. 559–63. Unfortunately, whereas constructivists tend to forget that states' identity change is nothing peculiar, some of Jervis's more materialist fellow realists tend to deny that state identities can change at all or that such changes matter.
- 26 Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- 27 Deborah W. Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- 28 Barbara Rearden Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- 29 See also Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: Uses and Misuses of History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. On heuristics and biases, see Amos Tversky, Thomas Gilvoh and Daniel Kahneman (eds), *Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. See also Thomas Gilvoh, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman (eds), *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- 30 Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- 31 Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- 32 Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence and American Foreign Policy in the Third World*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994. See also, Jervis and Snyder (eds), *Dominoes and Bandwagons*.
- 33 Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. See also Jervis and Snyder, *Dominoes and Bandwagons*; Daryl Press, *Calculating Credibility*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005; and Shiping Tang, 'Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict', *Security Studies*, 2005, vol. 24, 34–62.
- 34 Rose McDermott, *Risk Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
- 35 Jeffrey Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- 36 Jervis with Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', pp. 564–65. Jervis, of course, has since corrected this important omission. See Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1985; Robert Jervis, 'Understanding Beliefs', *Political Psychology*, 2006, vol. 27, 641–62. For recent attempts of synthesizing emotion and cognition, see Jonathan Mercer, 'Rationality and Psychology in International Politics', *International Organization*, 2005, vol. 59, 77–106.
- 37 Of course, the expulsion of emotion from psychology in the 1950–60s was a reaction against psychology's earlier excessive focus on emotion.
- 38 For a classic statement on the 'totalitarian' ego, see Anthony G. Greenwald, 'The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History', *American Psychologists*, 1980, vol. 35, 603–18. For motivated biases in our reasoning, see Ziva Kunda, 'The Case for Motivated Reasoning', *Psychological Bulletin*, 1990, vol. 108, 480–98.
- 39 See also Jervis, *Logic of Images*, pp. 90–96.
- 40 Shiping Tang, 'The Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): Or Why Is International Cooperation Difficult?', unpublished manuscript.
- 41 Irving Lester Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*, New York: Free Press, 1977, Chapters 11 and 12. See also, Lebow, *Between Peace and War*; and Jervis, 'Understanding Beliefs', esp. 652–57.
- 42 Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, [1932] 1960, xx–xxv, pp. 89–93. See also Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; and Shiping Tang, 'Reconciliation and the Remaking of Anarchy', *World Politics*, 2011, vol. 63, 711–49.

- 43 See Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'; and *P&M*.
- 44 See Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time*.
- 45 Tang, 'Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict'.
- 46 See, Janice Gross Stein, 'Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat', *Political Psychology*, 1988, vol. 9, 245-71; Barbara Farnham, 'Political Cognition and Decision-Making', *Political Psychology*, 1990, vol. 11, 83-111; and Tang, 'Reconciliation and the Remaking of Anarchy'.
- 47 Khong, *Analogies at War*; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. For an earlier important discussion on the methodological challenges of testing psychological hypotheses that addresses only part of the broad challenge, see Chaim D. Kaufmann, 'Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations for Political Decision Making,' *International Studies Quarterly*, 1994, vol. 38, 557-86.
- 48 Tang, 'Reconciliation and the Remaking of Anarchy'.
- 49 See, for example, Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Relations: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- 50 Jervis with Balzacq, 'The Logic of Mind: Interview with Robert Jervis', pp. 562-63.
- 51 Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, revised edn, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Oxford: Blackwell, [1939] 1994.
- 52 Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*; and Tang, 'Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust)'.